The overly permeating and worrisome accusations against the prevailing political systems, their ruling regimes and elections governing organs, as prodders of post-elections’ contestations, extra-judicial killings and incessant conflicts with extensive devastating loss of material and human lives, in sub-Saharan African countries, more than elsewhere in the world, have phenomenally become inauspicious to majority of the countries’ populations; and even to foreign stakeholders in the political, economic, and social landscapes in this region. Consequently, there is dreadful abhorrence and extensive trepidations against these supra and sub-supra structures and their actors, to the extent that, most actors of these structures are allegedly living in hiding within their countries, or simply refuging in other parts of the world for fear of reprisals from irate local populations; who believe to have been incessantly and brutally robbed; and unjustifiably removed away from their electoral victories, especially in Nigeria with its INEC; and in Cameroon with its ELECAM, in these countries’ political landscapes over several years[1, 2]. Nonetheless, Nigeria and Cameroon’s political systems, ruling regimes, and their elections governing organs, have ceaselessly laid claims upon midwifing highly enviable democratic performances; as Nigeria peddle its federalism and the Independent Election Commission (INEC); while Cameroon parades its unitary centralism and the Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) as proofs [3]. “In fact, from the public utterances of the actors of the elections governing organ and the ruling regime in Cameroon, one may take home the impression that, ELECAM is a very credible outfit for enhancing peace and stability in Cameroon, irrespective of the several accusations of electoral malpractices, supposedly perpetuated by the ruling regime, incarnated by the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement, (CPDM) in total connivance with the ELECAM; against the Social Democratic Front, (SDF) in 1990 and thereafter; and La Mouvement de la Renaissance du Cameroun (MRC), the Movement for the Rebirth of Cameroon in the 2018 presidential election in Cameroon”, opines (Ketchum 2020:6). However, people argue that, these utterances are baseless, given the ceaseless and devastating post-electoral contestations and violence that have persistently rocked Nigeria and Cameroon’s political scenes, not only during the 2018 presidential election, but in all other elections since the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1990 in Cameroon; and in Nigeria since the return to civilian rule in[4], Adebayo 2018, Ketchum. So, this paper is mounted to argue that, whereas, elsewhere in the world, political systems, their ruling regimes and election governing bodies, perform very credible, sensitive and admirable national duties with high degree of expectant respectability, transparency, accountability, fair play, all combining to provide level playing grounds for participants in the electoral processes, in African countries, these structures appear to be epitomes of political, economic and social disasters to peace, stability and democracy, especially in these two countries; hence, the prevailing disappearance of prosperity, progress and happiness for the ever-growing populations of African countries, which[5]. calls“prismatic societies”, implying societies still in their heydays of underdevelopment. Certainly, no right thinker will want to live with political, economic and social vices, because vices thwart peace, security, social cohesion; while grossly negating democracy; including political, economic and social progress, prosperity and happiness, and above all, human development; not only in African countries, but elsewhere; where they occur [6]. Using the structural-functional theory and the historical research method; I am compelled to determine if the prevailing political systems their ruling regimes and elections governing organs in most African countries; asphyxiate rather than promote peace, stability and democracy, with focus on Nigeria’s federalism and its INEC and Cameroon’s unitary centralism and its ELECAM.

The Structural-Functional Theory

The structural-Functional theory has been chosen for this paper, because it offers succinct and relevant explanations about the character of state organisation in modern political discourses and landscapes; as it is invariably, the scholarly trust of this author; for characterising a popular character of political system; which produces distinct structures and functions; and by extension the performance and capacity of it regime to meet the welfare needs of its citizens. Structural-Functionalism sees society as a unique structure with interrelated parts which are designed to perform specific functions for meeting the social needs of the individuals in that society. This theory grew out of the writings of an English philosopher and biologist, Hebert Spencer (1820-1903), who saw similarities between society and the human body; as he argued that, just as the various organs of the body work together to keep the body functioning, depending on how healthy the organs are, so too do the various parts of society or the state, which constitutes the political system, must work together to keep the society functioning with reasonable performance and capacity for satisfying societal human needs; such as peace and stability (Spencer 1898). Structural and functional perspective, focuses on the study of structure (organisation and institutions) and functions (public policies and maintenance) of society and how these major components of the supra structure relate within themselves in catering for the citizens, which the institutions rules. Accordingly, “society – represented by the political system and its regime comprise a complex system, whose parts must work together for the solidarity and stability of the whole – the country”. Most importantly, this theory holds that, “... it is the way that an institution is structured that actually fashions its functionality, and by extension the degree of its performance and capacity to deliver the common good” [7]. Consequently, if an institution is poorly structured, the tendency is to have poor functions and thus, poor or low performance and capacity to deliver whatever is required of such a structure and vice versa. So, the way in which a society is organised/structured, through its political system and the ruling regime, matters so much in dictating the way; the society’s inherent institutions and public policies function and perform. The parts of society that Spencer referred to were the social and political institutions – the parliament, judiciary, executive and their relations to one another; including their by-products, such as the INEC in Nigeria, and ELECAM in Cameroon; and the patterns of beliefs and behaviours of their actors, which are focused on meeting or not; the social needs, such as good governance, security, agriculture, education, family welfare, healthcare, religion, and the economy. Another famous structural-functionalist is Robert Merton (1910–2003), who facilitated the catapulting of this theory into political science and public administration discourses. He pointed out that, social, political and administrative processes often have many functions depending on the character of their structure/organisation. These are (i) manifest functions, which are the consequences of a social process that are sought or anticipated, and (ii) latent functions, which are the unsought consequences of social processes. The manifest functions of political systems and regimes, for example, include organising free and fair elections, dissuading social, political and economic injustice, resisting the occurrence of post-election contestations, extra-judicial killings and destruction of human lives and materials things in society. Latent functions of political systems and regimes; include keeping the society at peace, freedom, stable and secured. On the other hand, the social processes that have undesirable consequences for the operation of society are called dysfunctions. According to pundits, structural functionalism is made of two parts. The first comes from the word structural, which refers to social structures – institutions, which produce repetitive patterns of A-Z that impact the whole society. This could include schools, work environments, canteen or restaurants, hospitals, roads, airports, courts, marriages and so on. The other part comes from the word functionalism, which talks about whether or not these institutions function properly by physically promoting order and stability, including providing for the day-to-day harmony of the citizens in their country. In general terms, structural-functionalism addresses society as a complex system, whose parts must work together to promote solidarity and stability. However, structures may encounter dysfunctions, which are the creation of institutional actors; in the political systems, ruling regimes, and their elections governing bodies, who operate the various institutions such as the INEC in Nigeria, and the ELECAM in Cameroon. Thus, the performances of INEC and ELECAM are (i) the offshoots of their prevailing political systems and the ruling regimes, (ii) the imbued character of the actors; all of which permeate their ethnic, personal and religious beliefs, behaviours and intentions into the larger political, economic and social thinking and power inclinations. Consequently, the performances of either INEC or ELECAM can hardly be isolated from the general mindsets of the rulers/actors of the prevailing political system and ruling regimes in Nigeria and Cameroon. The unpalatable inclinations to monopolise political power; even if such power is lost through an election and whether such monopoly is at the detriment of the general will of the people; instigate the rulers/actors to circumvent the rules of the political game in the countries’ electoral governing bodies into his or her favour, irrespective of the consequences of such circumventions. Thus, it is the inordinate instincts to circumvent the rules of free and fair elections; and to monopolise power once obtained, which are tenaciously imbued by most sub-Saharan African political power holders; and even those who prospect for power; including those who are appointed to manage the electoral governing bodies, that provoke the upheavals, incessant post-elections contestations, extra-judiciary killings - jungle justice, conflicts, disruption of peace, stability with extensive loss of human and material lives more in sub-Saharan African countries, than elsewhere in the world.

This paper adopts the historical research, because it is a method which systematically recapture the complex nuances, the people/actors, meanings, events, and even the ideas of the past that have influenced and shaped the present" [8]. The method heavily relies on a wide variety of sources, which essentially include: (i) primary, and (ii) secondary. In addition, this method involves studying, understanding and interpreting past events, which the research did not live to see at their occurrence. The purpose of historical research is to reach into the insights or conclusions about past persons or occurrences for the purposes of predicting the future. Historical research entails more than simply compiling and presenting factual information; it also requires interpretation of the information, because it permits the researcher to collect and collate data using specific techniques and guidelines that writers use in obtaining dependable information for solving a perceived social, political or economic problem in society. For instance, the accusations of prodding post-elections contestations, extra-judicial killings, conflicts and loss of human and material things against the political systems, the ruling regimes; and their elections’ governing organs in sub-Saharan African countries on one part; and the claims by Nigeria and Cameroon for harbouring credible political systems and ruling regimes; and conducting free and fair elections via their prevailing elections organs; can be authenticated using historical data obtained from the past events in the two countries. Primary and secondary sources and material evidence such as that derived from oral literature and archaeology may all be drawn on, and the researcher’s skill lies in identifying these sources, evaluating their relative authority, and combining their testimony appropriately in order to arrive at dependable inferences. However, doing historical research is not as simple as solving a mathematical problem, since it requires just the right approach and mental conditions, or else you are likely to find a wrong answer. The historical research methodology is justifiably used in this paper, because, most of the data used for this research relates to the past activities of the political systems, the ruling regimes, and their electoral governing bodies in Nigeria and Cameroon. Essentially, the method permits for relevant generalisation of the outcomes of these supra and sub-supra structures in Nigeria and Cameroon; with the latitude to infer into other sub-Saharan African countries. With this method, the central research purpose, which is to discern and divulge to larger world; how these events have molded the present conditions in Nigeria and Cameroon, and to other sub-Saharan African countries, to the extent that, they have given birth to the mountains of accusations of election malpractices; notwithstanding the claims of electoral credibility widely peddled by Nigeria and Cameroon. Having shown the linkages, we can now move on. To begin with, the concepts of “the culture of democracy” and “constitutionalism” as we have it today, gained large spectrum currency in the ancient Athens circa 508 B.C [9]. However, it is important to stress here that, in the ancient Greece, where there were many city-states with different forms of governments, democracy was contrasted with governance by elites (aristocracy), by one person (monarchy), by tyrants (tyranny). In all, there is strong evidence to believe that, elections were used as early in history as ancient Greece and throughout the medieval period to select rulers such as the Holy Roman Emperor in the form of Imperial elections and Papal elections in the form of religious elections. The modern "election", which consists of electing people in the form of contestable recruitment of those people (politicians) into various public offices, did not emerge until the beginning of the 17^th century, when the idea of representative government took hold in North America and Europe [10]. Thus, questions of suffrage, especially suffrage for minority groups, (age, gender and race) have usually dominated the history of elections. Males, the dominant cultural group in North America and Europe, often dominated the electorate and continue to do so in many countries even today. In South Africa under apartheid, race relations between whites, blacks and coloured became an issue of extensive contestations [11, 12]. Early elections in countries such as the United States and United Kingdom were dominated by landed or ruling class males. However, by 1920 all Western European and North American democracies had universal adult male suffrage (except Switzerland) and many countries began to consider women suffrage as well. Despite legally mandated universal suffrage for adult males, political barriers were sometimes erected to prevent fair access to elections, hence the beginning of demand for civil rights by organised movements, especially in the United States. In the study of politics and in the conduct of elections as an important component of democracy, the question of who may vote is a central issue in all elections. The electorate does not generally and forcefully include the entire population; for example, many countries prohibit those who are under the age of majority from voting. Consequently, all jurisdictions require a minimum age for voting, (See for instance, Article 45 of Law No 2012/001 of 19^thApril 2012, relating to the Cameroon Electoral Code, as it stipulates the conditions for attaining suffrage. “The elector must be persons of Cameroonian nationality, without distinction of sex, aged 20 years, duly registered in the electoral register, enjoying all his or her civic rights, who effectively must have resided in the voting locality for a period of six months in Cameroon, and who does not suffer any incapacity stipulated by the Law. In Australia, the Aborigines were not given the right to vote until 1962 and in 2010 the Australian Federal Government removed the rights of prisoners serving for three years or less to vote. Given this, ironically, a large proportion of these disenfranchised people were Aboriginal Australians [13, 14] In Cameroon and Nigeria, like in most sub-Saharan African countries, this aspect of election operations is so sensitive because, it attempts to disenfranchise a good number of potential voters or lures potential voters to ruling party. Consequently, it evokes extensive disagreements between various political parties; thereby becoming the basis for the several devastating post-election contestations. As Jega supports, “most political systems and regimes in sub-Saharan African countries, (Nigeria and Cameroon inclusive), disenfranchised or enfranchise their citizens through the aging system, depending how favourable such as an action may be to the ruling regime.” However, in countries with advanced cultures of democracy, independent organs responsible for dealing with issues arising from disenfranchisement or enfranchisement of citizens exist, and not necessarily the electoral bodies, which is responsible for registering electors [15, 16]. Thus, the concept of universal suffrage, as hot as it usually presents itself, as it is usually at the heart of the interests of most political party, especially the ruling party in every political system. In crafting electoral laws, ruling political parties are inclined to ensuring that the concept of universal suffrage is adequately protected in its favour, especially in centralised unitary political systems, which encounter very minimal oppositions [17]. Thus, this concepts suffers further limits which may be imposed such as age, (because in most countries, voting age maybe reduced to 18 years because, here youths dominate) gender, place and duration of habitation, especially when a ruling political party controls the law making institutions – the legislature. However, in the European Union, one can vote in municipal elections if one lives in the municipality and is an EU citizen the nationality of the country of residence may not be required (White 2017:56). As White (2017:78) notes, “... in some countries, voting is required by law; and where an eligible voter does not cast a vote, he or she may be subject to punitive measures such as a fine.” In Western Australia, the penalty for a first time offender failing to vote is a $20.00 fine, which increases to $50.00 if the offender refused to vote subsequently (Hans 2012, Smith 2016:4). Basically, election management and electoral governance form the foundation of the concept of modern democracy [18, 19]. Essentially too, these are sensitive and crucial public institutions, which epitomise the presence, significance and the character of democracy, based on the nature of their political systems and electoral laws. Indisputably, elections have become the epicentres of the concept of democracy, as they are used even by tyrannical regimes as parameters for showcasing democracy in a country. Certainly, most people argue that, elections are not the surest measures for advancing democracy in a country, although they remain a powerful factor. As a researcher, I might agree with this position, but I am deeply confounded in it, because, though election management and electoral governance are the foundations of modern democracy, the characters and outcomes of election management and electoral governance, appear to differ astronomically in different countries, even if such countries claim as they do, to embrace the culture of democracy. While in some countries, election management and electoral governance evoke palatable statesmanship exercises, which endow great respect and honours to the actors in this process, in other countries; this process evokes disheartening, disrespectfulness and dishonourable images to the actors. Essentially, it appears these differences are imbedded in the type of political systems, which most countries adopt in their respective countries [20]. But how are these differences constructed to produce the characters and outcomes of the practice of democracy? Can there be any uniformity of characters and outcomes of election management and electoral governance in democracies? Are these characters and outcomes, which are usually associated with some democracies, resulting from the mindsets of the political actors in countries’ democratisation processes Certainly, democracy, especially its sensitive aspects of election management and electoral governance do not operate in isolation of the overall characteristics which constitute the national life of a given country; including the mindsets of actors. In this wise, social scientists, have identified the political system, which is used in a given country as being the mainstay that produces the character of democracy and the organs which actualizes the culture of democracy in that country [21- 23]. So, are there any correlations between the practice of democracy and its components such as election management and electoral governance on one hand; and the prevailing political system in a country? So far, in what manner do these correlations impact the election management and electoral governance and their outcomes?.

Correlating Nigeria’s Federalism and INEC and Cameroon’s Unitary Centralism and ELECAM

Before we devolve into correlating the concept of political systems, their differences, similarities and their impact to election governance, using the cases of federalism and INEC in Nigeria and Unitary Centralism and ELECAM in Cameroon, it is important aligning with (Dahl and Stinebrickner, that, there are two extreme but common views about political systems. According to one view, political systems never vary in their important aspects in terms of providing or not, the leeway to its actors, to constantly seeking to hold firm unto political or state power. According to the other, political systems are like plastics, as they can be molded to suit the heart’s desires of its operators; consequently, political systems can be either autocratic or democratic

Explaining and Understanding the Concept of Political Systems

In order that we better explain the concept and nature of a political system, it will be helpful if we first attempt to define certain words which are frequently used in everyday speech but whose meanings are not always clear; and words which are directly linked to the concept of political systems. For instance, we use the word ‘government’ in a variety of ways. In a general sense, we use it to mean an orderly way of running a community’s affairs. In this sense, it is possible to distinguish between local, regional and central and national governments. The absence of government causes anarchy, because everyone looks after him or herself, which some people interpreted as jungle justice [24, 25]. In a more specific sense, we speak of the government as a body of people who have power to make us behave in certain ways that renders us to adapt to certain socially conformist behaviours and manner of thinking. Because, this body of people constitutes the government, they have the authority as well as the power for coercing the outputs of the desired compliances. In other words, their power is legitimate, if obtained legitimately that is with the consent of the people [26, 27]. And in this research, when we talk of legitimacy, we refer to the ability or process of producing men and women who occupy electoral offices as a result of the legal conduction of elections and the management of electoral system with the full consent of the electorate. In this sense, the electorate must have been given the freedom to get their names registered in free playing ground electoral register, be informed well on time, as to when, where, how and why elections are taking place. The electorate must well in advance; know the people, who seek to be voted into political offices, to understand their manifestoes – that is, their electoral programmes, which spell out their ideological inclinations, especially in terms of what they electorate expects from them, after obtaining their political mandates. All these and other vital aspects of the conduct of the election constitute the legitimacy required for people to hold elective offices. Above all, all these lead to the legitimate prescriptions of holding political power in a state. Thus, the discussion about how this power is achieved is certainly the main trust of this work, which is how elections management and electoral governance are conducted to produce those who control state power and uses this state power over the ruled, especially the sensitive domains of public policy and decision making in a society. Another word frequently used in this context is the state. Often, we see it as being synonymous with government, with the two words being sometimes used interchangeably; although in the spirit of political science as an academic discipline, these words are distinct in terms of construction, explanation, application and understanding, notwithstanding that, they both fall within the same category or armpit in the governing process. To some extent this is quite valid; a government department might also be called a Department of State. The word ‘State’ should be used a little more precisely, however; and it this point it is necessary to mention that, governments come and go, as we all know; but the state may be said to be permanent, comprising all the apparatuses by which a community is governed - armed forces, the police, the civil service, the judicial system, the belief system, the education, health, foreign policy and the overall mentality and perception capacities of society. The word can also be used to describe a country which has an independent, internationally recognised, government, such as the State of Israel, State of Nigeria or the State of Egypt or the State of Cameroon. But what then, in this work, can we say of the United States? Is this another use of the word State? No, the word is applicable to a nation or parts of a nation to signify its federating components or entities. It just happens that the modern world consists largely of nation-states and the United States is simply a nation-state comprising fifty federating or sub-national states, all of which pay allegiance to the central authority – the national government. In this sense, the federating state is a just a nomenclature, which identifies only with its locally constituted group of people to the extent that, it cannot enter into international relations with free sovereign states [28, 29]. Within this same broad context in this work, we speak of politicians. They are the people who achieve, or hope to achieve political power and who through such achievement of political power aspire to run the government and the country. The word politicians squarely fit in this work, in that; these word connotes those people who are the principal co-actors in the election management and electoral governance processes in every society. They represent that segment of the indigenous population who are elected to occupy political offices in a democracy. They are the central figures whose pre-election or post-election characters conduct the state and it’s supporting populations into post-electoral contestations or not. The politicians are the main purveyors of social cohesion or disintegration in every country, because their languages and physical comportments have a lot to tell about their future istic usage of state power in the country. The politicians usually work under the canopy of the political parties in which they militate; and on winning an election or supposedly so; they eventually control the power of bureaucrats by way of formulating public policies and decision-making Thus, civil servants, members of the armed forces, judges and similar public servants are the permanent personnel of the state, while the politicians provide the temporary elements of the state power because, as the civil servants are permanent personnel of the public service, politicians are the transient personnel of the same public service of the state. The politicians are temporal because they come after winning an election and go at the expiration of tenure of office; as specified by the constitution of a country. Exactly how politicians achieve state or political power need to concern us in this work, as this is evident in this work’s topic. Thus, it is important to highlight that, state or political power is obtained mostly on behalf of the people and forcefully through their consent that is the democratic approach. However, “... as simple and conventional as this type of obtaining state or political power appears, at times it can be obtained fraudulence – that orchestrating electoral malpractices of buying votes, outright stuffing of ballot boxes, or even conniving with electoral organs to register ghost voters. Again, political or state power can be obtained through a revolution or coup d’état – that is forceful military takeover of power from other military rulers or even elected politicians, [30]. Consequently, the words government and state are rather static terms but if we add to them the political dimensions, provided by politicians, and their activities, we have something much more dynamic, which we call the political system. So, a political system can be probably be best understood in terms of demand-response terms. Simply put, a political system is a collection of political, social, economic and cultural elements or institutions, of the whole society that interact with one another and that individually and collectively exercise influence over the individuals and collectivities, which constitute the elements of the whole system. In reflecting on this notion of what a political system is, it is important to remember that a system is a way of looking at something(s) in terms of parts and the parts which constitute the whole [31, 32 ]. In various political systems and in majority of countries, politicians are elected to positions of power and authority, with the ballot box giving the ordinary citizens an opportunity to make his or her choice and demands known. Generally politicians try to anticipate these demands from the electorate by offering a prospectus or a manifesto, of what they will provide if elected, and the electors can then choose between the prospective public office holders’ manifestoes. Once a political party has been elected to office it should be judged by its performance and the electorate’s responses to that performance must again be demonstrated through the ballot box at the subsequent elections. In most political systems, it is the periodic character for using the ballot box, to legitimately permit the electorate, in choosing their political office holders that causes most post-elections contestations. In such cases, the actors in such every political system must play, which crytalises transparent elections management and electoral governance, in order to instill confidence in the participants (the electorate) in such political system.

Certainly, there might be some difficulties in arriving at a catch-all or all-purpose classification of political systems, but it will pertinent to identify some differences to enable us move on to similarities. For instance, a geographer might distinguish political systems according to the area they occupy, a demographer by the number of persons who are governed, a lawyer according to their legal codes. A philosopher or theologian could be interested in distinguishing a political system in terms of “the best”, which is how a political system will use ethical or religious criteria to foster human development. A social scientist could be interested in distinguishing a political system in terms of determining how a revolution is related to economic conditions, thus classifying systems by relative income and frequency of revolutions. Just as there is no one best way of classifying people, so too there is no single best way of distinguishing and classifying political systems for all purposes. Even though there are immeasurable differences among political systems, some are associated with such a broad range of important consequences, particularly consequences for popular government – which are particularly worth stressing. We shall mention and briefly elaborate them here as follows.

Every political system has had, in some respects, a unique past. This is more than an abstract point, for the inheritance of the past bears heavily on the present which grossly affects the future. Differences in their past mean that the 190-odd states of the world do not have exactly the same options. A people who have known nothing but centuries of authoritarian rule are not likely to turn into a stable democracy in a week, months or just a few years For instance, Gros (1995) observes, “from 1966 to 1985 and 1985 to 1990, Cameroonians had lived under strong stints of dictatorial regimes of one party rules: the CNU – Cameroon National Union and CPDM – Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement. It was not until 1990, that Cameroonian started witnessing aspects of multi- party politics and some air of democracy [31-33]. Similarly, in Nigeria, there have several strong stints of military dictatorial rules, which have greatly hampered the growth and blossoming of Nigeria’s federalism and to account for the growth of democracy, in terms of election management and electoral governance. So, the non-practice or non-practice of democracy or dictatorship has largely fashioned the political systems, federalism in Nigeria and unitary centralism in Cameroon.

Socio-Economic Levels or Degree of “Modernity

History leaves political systems embedded in societies that are at different stages of “modernisation”, although the term modernisation now used widely by political scientists has a parochial air about it, but its meaning can be made quite specific, enough so, indeed, to allow for measurement. There are in short profound differences from one country to another in income per capita, literacy, education, technical skills, technology, industrialisation, urbanisation, newspaper and magazine circulation, access to computers and the internet, transportation facilities, and the like. These all tend to be correlated as follows: A country relatively low (that is less “modern”) in one respect will very likely be relative low in other respects, and the converse is true as well. (See table 2 below) As the above table indicates, the higher the annual per capita income, the lower the infant mortality rates, the longer the life expectancy at birth, and the higher the proportion of appropriately aged person in higher and primary education. There might be one slight departure from the clear overall relationship between income and indicators of “modernity”, which does not undermine two important points, namely: (a) national political systems vary substantially in the modernity of their accompanying societies, and (b) Gross National Product (GNP) per capita is a particularly useful statistics tool in analyzing national political systems because, GNP is closely associated with many other important features of a country’s society (World Bank, 2000:xxiv).

Table 1: This table is based on the World Bank’s classification of 148 countries’ economies with populations of more than 1 million and for which data are reported by the relevant authority.

Source: The 2000 World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000, p. xxii

Distribution of Political Resource and Skills

Certainly, one difference in the character of political systems is the way political resources and skills are distributed in society. The degree of inequality in the distribution of political resources varies from one system to another. For example, knowledge is a political resource that can contribute mightily to how much influence an individual wields. Access to knowledge through literacy and education is distributed unequally in every political system, but in some political systems, such as unitary centralism, the inequality is greater than in others (Dahl and Stinebrickner 2005:69). For example let us imagine sets of literacy and education data for three hypothetical societies: (a) A society in which virtually everyone can read and virtually everyone of the appropriate age attends primary and secondary schools; (b) A society in which about one- half of the people can read and about one-half of the appropriately aged person attend primary and secondary schools; (c) A Society in which no one can read and no one attends primary and secondary schools. Certainly, there is more equally distributed access to knowledge through literacy in primary and secondary schools’ attendance in the political systems embedded in societies (a) and (c), than in the political system in society (2). Following a period of industrialisation, some countries have made a further transition to a new kind of society, such as modern, dynamic, pluralist, as incomes and mass consumption continue to increase, and mass communication. This diffusion also may be accompanied by a marked expansion in interest group organizations, political skills, and voting rights. Thus, information and knowledge become unusually important resources for gaining and maintaining influence and various “information and knowledge elites” come to play crucial roles in decisions. This point addresses the sorts of conditions that facilitate democracy in political systems.

Bases of Cleavage and Cohesion

The patterns of disagreement, conflict and coalition have different causes in different political systems. This proposition and the following literature should be understood with attention. It opposes a widespread view that political conflict can be explained by a single source of cleavage, usually an economic characteristic like “class” or “property”. Actually, in spite of an enormous amount of speculations, theory and research, our understanding of conflict in political systems is still limited. For instance single-factor explanations simply do not stand up well against the date now available. The kinds of individual and group characteristics that are associated with conflict in countries include not only differences in social status, economic class, income, wealth, and occupation, but also in education, ideology, religion, language, regions, and family origins. This multiplicity of factors creates different patterns of cleavage and cohesion from one country to another.

The Magnitude or Severity of Conflicts

The severity of conflict varies over time within any given political system and from one system to another during the same period of time. Whatever difficulties may lurk in this proposition must not be allowed to obscure the fact that on common-sense grounds, the proposition is hardly open to doubt. For instance, more than a century ago, Americans were engaged in killing one another on a massive scale in a civil war; and that obviously was a severe conflict. The coup d’état (military take-over of government) in Indonesia in 1966 in which the Sukarno regime was overturned and several hundred thousand people were killed was unquestionably a severe conflict. Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia that killed and maimed thousand and produced endless streams of refugees in the 1990s is another and more recent example of severe conflict. Armed rebellion, civil war, violent revolution, guerilla warfare, street battles, repeated suicide bombings occurring in civilian areas, mass exile are all various characters of severe conflicts. Speeches, debates, peaceful assemblies, and peaceful elections are not conflict. Within any particular political system, the temperature of conflict fluctuates. Thus, the severity of conflicts varies in one political system to another, and this obviously makes a difference in the nature of political systems.

Institutions for Sharing and Exercising State and Political Power

Finally, political systems differ in their institutions for sharing and exercising influence and power. A potentially very important corollary is that political systems also differ in the distribution of influence – in the extent to which, in Aristotle’s terms, “influence is distributed to one, few, or many. But given the problems in observing and measuring influence, belief in this corollary must rest largely on indirect evidence. And the most persuasive indirect evidence is the difference in the institutions such as ELECAM in Cameroon and INEC in Nigeria, which provide opportunities for citizens for sharing in the processes of making policies enforced by the government or state. This difference in institutions for sharing and exercising influence and power is one to which contemporary political scientists pay a great deal of attention, such as the ELECAM in Cameroon and INEC in Nigeria.

Identifying the Similarities in Political Systems

 Given the definition we earlier presented of political systems as “a collection of elements that interact in some way with one another and that individually and collectively exercise influence and power over the individuals and collectivities that constitute the elements or part of the system,”we now turn to identify the similarities of political systems, haven identified the differences. Like in organic or inorganic phenomenon, all political systems have varied difference is in the nature and character. Such differences give them, the specificities in their modus operandi, which also characterize and epitomizes the nature and character of institutions, the actors, including the political, economic, social and even cultural environments in which they operate. Accordingly, we shall engage into discussing the differences as follows:

Uneven Access to Political Resources

Political resources are the means by which a person or persons can exert influence over another person or persons. A first similarity among political systems is that, the control over political resources is spread unevenly. There are at least four reasons why this is so.

• Some specialisation level of function exists in every society; although in advanced societies, specialisation is more extensive. Specialisation of function (the division of labour) creates differences in access to different political resources.
• Because of inherited differences, not all people start life with the same access to resources, and those with a head start often increase their lead. Individuals and societies are to some extent prisoners of the past; they never start with a completely clean slate either biologically or socially. Some endowments are biological. Many endowments, such as wealth, social standing, or the level of education and aspirations of one’s parents are not biological, however, but social. Whatever their source, differences in biological and social endowments at birth often multiply into even greater differences in resources among adults. Almost everywhere, for example, opportunities for education are related at least in part to the wealth, social standing, or political positions of one’s parents.
• Differences in biological and social inheritance, together with differences in experiences, all produce differences in the incentives and goals of different people in a society. Differences in motivation in turn lead to differences in skills and in resources. Not everyone is equally motivated to exercise influence, to become a leader, or to acquire the resources that help the leader gain influence over others.

Finally, some difference in incentives and goals usually are encouraged in societies in order to equip individuals for different specialties.

Quest for Influence over Government

Some members of the political system seek to gain influence over the policies, rules, and decisions enforced by the government, while others do not. People seek influence over government not necessarily for its own sake, but because control over the government helps them to achieve one or more other goals. Control over the government is such a familiar way of furthering one’s goals or values that it is hard to imagine a political system in which no one sought such influence.

Uneven Distribution of Influence over Government

Influence over government is distributed unevenly among the individuals living in a political system. Clearly, this proposition is closely related to the first similarity we noted above, which dealt with resources. Because some people have more resources with which they can influence the government, it is easier for them to gain more influence over government if and when they wish to do so. Thus, people with more influence over government can use their influence to gain control over more political resources than those who do not exert or possess such influence. I n the Politics, Aristotle sought to explain and justify the differences in the authority of master and slave; husband and wife; parent child. Twenty centuries later, in the midst of the Enlightenment, Rousseau sought to explain and attack inequalities of power. Herein, Rousseau traced the origins of inequalities of power to inequalities of property. Inequality of property, he maintains, led in turn to inequalities in other resources. Less than a century after Rousseau, Marx and Engels put forth similar explanations in the Communist Manifesto and a series of other revolutionary works that followed. Sometimes the proposition that, influence over government is distributed unequally is confused with Mosca’s hypothesis that, in every political system, there is a ruling class, but the one does not imply the other.

Pursuit and Resolution of Conflicting Aims

People, who live in a state, pursue conflicting aims, which are dealt with, among other means, by the government of the state. Conflict and consensus are both important aspects of the political systems. People who live together never agree about everything, especially election results, but if they are to continue to live together, they cannot wholly disagree in their aims. Although political theorists have recognized this duality, some have placed more emphasis on the one than the other. Thinkers such as Hobbes have stressed the propensity of people to conflict with one another, while Aristotle and Rousseau, stress people’s propensity for agreement and cooperation. Thus, in every political system, the government of the state must typically step in when conflict is considered beyond resolution by concerned individuals or processes in a political system, given that the state must always present itself as the most dependable arbiter.

Leaders in a political system try to ensure that whenever governmental means are used to deal with conflict, the decisions reached are widely accepted not soled from fear of violence, punishment, or coercion, but also from a belief that, it is morally right and proper to do so. According to one usage of the term, a government is said to be “legitimate” if the people to whom its orders are directed believe that the structure, procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials, or leaders of the government possesses the quality of “rightness”, propriety, or moral goodness. Thus, our fourth proposition is equivalent to saying: Leaders in a political system must try to endow their actions with legitimacy. An enormous variety of political systems seem to have gained undue legitimacy in various times and places. Even in the relatively democratic society of the United States, political systems that reflect quite contradictory principles of organization acquire legitimacy. For instance, business firms, government agencies, and some religious association are organized according to hierarchical rather than democratic principles. Yet many citizens who concede legitimacy to the American government because of its democratic structure also concede legitimacy to these hierarchical sub-systems in the state.

Leaders in a political system usually expose a set of more or less persistent, integrated doctrines that purports to explain and justify their leadership in the political system. A set of doctrines of doctrines of this kind is often called an ideology. And this is what [34, 35] called it a “political formula”. One reason why leaders develop an ideology is obvious: to endow their leadership with authority and even legitimacy, and thus to enable them to exert the most economical form of influence on a regular and sustained basis in society. As we have tried to explain, all political systems acquire the essence of trying to rule by authority than by coercion, though coercion is always unavoidable since, leaders do not always want to leave political power once obtained. That is why some leaders, including the highest governmental officials and their allies, usually expose an ideology that justifies not only their leadership but also the national political system itself.

The Impact of Other Political Systems

The functioning of a political system is affected by the existence of other political systems. With occasional exceptions, so rare that they can be ignored as a small and completely isolated club or tribe, for example, political systems do not exist in isolation. Exceptional cases aside, every political system engages into foreign relations, for the actions open to one system are affected by the past, present or probable the future actions of one or several other political systems. Given this possibility of one political system affecting another one, it plausible to assert that, in the case of Nigeria and Cameroon, being close neigbours as they are, the management of election and electoral governance in Nigeria or Cameroon can affect the conduct of the same activities either in Nigeria or in Cameroon and vice versa. Situation could arise given the proximity of economic, social and political activities of the people and even their cultural ties. Consequently, as a country cannot ignore the activities of another country, especially in the current world where globalisation is holding sway, a city cannot successfully ignore the existence of a national government, alliances, coalitions, and international organisations. Thus, as Dahl and Stinebickner (2007) believe, “…the influence of another political system is so obvious that it would scarcely need mentioning if it were not for the curious fact that most people who portray their vision of an ideal political system ignore the limits imposed by the existence of other political systems.” It is therefore, easy to imagine, “the good society” if one does not bother with other, and quite possibly bad, societies that might clutter up the surrounding landscape. Consequently, political utopias are usually portrayed in fiction without the troublesome limitations imposed by foreign relations, which are eliminated by either ignoring them entirely or solving them according to some simple plan. Similarly, a club or a religious organisation cannot act with complete autonomy; and even the leaders of a labour union must take into account the part or probable actions of business firms, other unions, and the government.

 The Inevitability of Change

Yet another similarity of all the political systems is the inevitability to change. As the saying goes, if there is anything on earth which is unstoppable is change. No matter the duration of any human creation, change always knocks at the door, and no matter how long it might take, such change will always occur. Thus, it is appropriate to close this section of this research by emphasizing a regularity that anticipates the contents of some of the recommendations in this research, which every political system must wait to experience, no matter the dexterity of the operators of a particular political system, which is: All political systems are bound to undergo changes [36- 38]. observes, “Historically, political observers have pointed out the mutability of political systems, seeing that everything which has a beginning also has an end.” As Plato, wrote, “even a constitution such as those of Nigeria and Cameroon upon which the present study is based, will not last forever, but will in time be dissolved and or changed.” With this characteristic, preference for imaginative and somewhat rigid theoretical notions drawn from brilliant speculations but not tested against concrete experience, Plato went to describe the inevitable process of decay through which even the perfect aristocracy he proposed must degenerate into a “timocracy” or government of honour, to be followed by oligarchy, thence by democracy, and finally by tyranny. Cuing from the dictates of the topic’s research objectives, and according to Dahl and Stinebrickner (2005) schemes for classifying political systems into different types and showing their differences and similarities; and identifying the influences, which political systems bare upon national institutions such as electoral bodies, are as old as the study and practice of politics itself.” For instance, as they observe, “Aristotle produced a classification of political systems based on two criteria, namely: the number of citizens entitled to rule a state, whether one, few, or many; and whether the rulers govern in the “common interests” or in “their selfish interests.” This famous six-fold classification (see the table below) has affected the thinking about the important differences among political systems ever since. Aristotle’s early and noteworthy classification scheme has been followed by many other such efforts, particularly in recent decades. But, is there one best typology, since there are several criteria for classifying political systems. In fact, which one we might find useful depend on the aspect of politics in which we are interested to study. In the specificities of this study’s cases, we are confronted in studying, understanding and explaining how elections management and electoral governance as salient aspects of democracy have been conducted by ELECAM in Cameroon and INEC in Nigeria, under specific political systems-federalism in Nigeria; and unitary centralism in Cameroon. In doing this, we are prompted to sort out the specific differences and similarities; and perhaps the convergences, which have fashioned the character of election management and electoral governance by the aforesaid public institutions in the respective countries. Having attempted to show

the important features in the similarities and differences between political systems, we will now turn to establish the linkage between a political systems and election management and electoral governance, especially as this concerns the present study. The research importance of establishing these linkages is to determine if these political systems have any influence(s) upon these institutions the INEC and ELECAM and their actors per se. Furthermore, it is to determine the extent and character of such influence, specifically as these affects or does not affect the character of election management and electoral governance and their outcomes in shaping the character of the democratic culture in Nigeria and Cameroon respectively.

Table 2: Aristotle’s Classification of Political Systems with slight modifications by this researcher.

Source: Political Systems Differences in Dahl and Stinebrickner, (2005) Modern Political Analysis, New York: Prentice Hall, p.66.

POLITICAL       SYSTEMS       AND       ELECTORAL GOVERNANCES: Linking Nigeria’s Federalism and Its (INEC); And Cameroon’s Unitary Centralised and Its (ELECAM)

Before demonstrating the linkages between the political systems (federalism for Nigeria’s federalism to (INEC) on one hand; and the Cameroon’s Unitary Centralism to the ELECAM on the other hand; it is pertinent to show the theoretical and empirical delineations of federalism and unitary centralism as political systems. This would enable us provide understanding of the linkages of these specific systems to their electoral bodies as institutions created to function within these political systems.

The Theoretical and Empirical Delineations of Federalism as a Political System

According to Ted Honderick et al, in Essays on Freedom of Action, (1973), the concept of federalism is the height of human thought in the science or art of state organisation and the conduct of politics of freedom of choice. This view collaborates with K. C. Wheare in Federal Government (4^thed.), (1963), as he states: “As of today, and since the times of the ancient Greece, the federal principle has amply been exemplified by the United States of America. Thus, it seems justifiable to maintain, therefore, that the difference in principle between the form of association embodied in the modern Constitution of the United States of America and the other forms

practical difference; so important, indeed, that it justifies us in placing the United States in a separate category among associations of states. And, further, since the United States is universally regarded as an example of federalism, it justifies us in describing the principle, which distinguishes it so markedly and so significantly, as the federal principle. By the federal principle, I mean the method of dividing or devolving state powers so that the central/federal; and regional/state and local governments are each, within its sphere, a co-ordinate and a semi-independent politico- administrative entity. This envisaged independence must appear to conjure absolute and manifest dictates of federalism in the conduct of affairs of the states by any institution, which is completely subordinate to the federal principle. Of course, the restriction of the word ‘federal’ to the sense just defined above may be objected to, by some students of politics and history on historical grounds rather on empiricism. Such students might apt to point out quite correctly, that the authors of the Federalist Papers for example used the word ‘federal’ and ‘federation’ to describe both the system set up by the Articles of Confederation in 1777* and that proposed by the Constitution of 1787. The fact is that up to 1787 the word ‘federal’ signified little more than a league of states resting upon the good faith of the parties* and it was the natural description of the Articles of Confederation. Indeed, what the authors of The Federalist Papers claimed for the Constitution of 1787 was not that it substituted a federation for a league but that it substituted an

efficient federation for an inefficient federation. Therefore, the foregoing provides the theoretical and empirical delineations of federalism as a political system and basis for understanding the term federalism and its implications in the conduct of politics under the political system called federalism. Basically, therefore, from the foregoing, the spirit of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, under which the INEC operates, is based upon the federal principle as enunciated by K. C. Wheare. As Honderick too observes, “the federal political system and the structure of governing a state; as opposed to the unitary centralised political system and structure of state organisation, is calm with man’s supreme will and desire for freedom of choice and action.” Man is imbued with the freedom of thought, which is the thought to be bound up with moral responsibility to allow ad imbue extensive checks and balance in the governing process. This freedom is also integral to other things, including man’s view of himself as a person and the sacred nature of his institutions that facilitate his choices and freedom, and, perhaps, this is of more immediate significance for the research ambition in this study. Under the federal system political arrangement, man is traditionally entitled to his free will, which J.

1. Satre called, “Freedom of Will”. This Will, he observes, “conceived as one among several faculties, is no longer much of discretion to be accorded or refused by another man upon another man.” Consequently, the term freedom of action has come to have a place in the dominant philosophical lexicon and usage; and has become most appropriate as a description of the subject-matter in governance. Unfortunately, “... freedom of action is not a loveable phrase amongst most political regimes in Africa, in fact, even those which claim democratic credentials” The example of freedom of action and speech is set forth in the United States of America (USA) with a federal political system, as it upholds the freedom of its citizens to unimpededly exercise their freedom in responsibility of one’s action. To this extent, the US has several sub-governments at the state level that have their own responsibilities to the citizens and a government at the national level that has a different set of responsibilities to the same citizens in the same one, united and indivisible country. Thus, some of the advantages of this type of state organisation are that, the federated states obtain governance through the ballot paper based on free and fair competitions by political parties, contesting on level grounds, provided by impartial electoral laws and crowned by firm constitutional provisions. On election, the rulers of this federated entities, build roads, schools – universities and other tertiary institutions, hospitals and other healthcare centres, regulate public and private corporations, govern land use and labour, and provide other innumerable services to the citizens, with the exception of entering into treaties with foreign states. The national government, on the other hand, regulates immigration laws, provides currency, organises the armed forces and conducts foreign policy, enters into international treaties, build national roads, universities, hospitals, and still provided several other services to the same citizens; each based on its legislative list. Unequivocally, the constitutional creation of legislative list solves the problem of confusion between, which services must be provided by which unit of government. However, sometimes of course, which government is responsible for what comes into question, and disputes are resolved in the courts. In the Unites States for instance, since its Civil War, the national government has generally been on the winning side in such disputes. Although several scholars, especially those in political science and public administration do not all agree on a single definition for the term federalism, it has been described as a political system of governmental structure or state organisation consisting of at least three constituent parts or levels of government that are not wholly independent, but together form the political system as a whole including its supportive institutions [39, 40]. Federalism is a political system in which the sovereign power is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and its constituent political units referred to as states, regions or provinces. Federalism provides a technique of constitutional organization that permits action by a shared use of state powers amongst federating governments for certain common purposes and statutory or constitutional responsibilities to the citizens, together with autonomous action by constituent units of government for purposes that relate to maintaining their distinctiveness, with each level directly responsible to its own electorate [41, 42]. Thus, going by the foregoing, it is appropriate to assert that, the INEC in Nigeria is an offshoot of the federal principle since its mandate and powers emanate from article 153 of the 1999 federal constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; which stipulates: There shall be established for the Federation the following bodies; namely:

• Code of Conduct Bureau;
• Council of State;
• Federal Character Commission;
• Federal Civil Service Commission;
• Federal Judicial Service Commission;
• Independent National Electoral

Article 154 (3) stipulates: “In exercising his powers to appoint a person as Chairman or member of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall consult the Council of State.” Worthy of note in the foregoing is that, the INEC is a constitutional body; the appointment of its officials falls within the powers of the President of the Federation, which is further subject to scrutiny by the Council of State, another body with constitutional powers. This character of existence of INEC obviously makes it to be an object of the federal principle and subject to the freedom of choice and action by the people of Nigeria in their massive majority to accept or reject officials to perform the duties as an INEC official. This openness is very pertinent for this study, given that, it influences and fashions the personalities, conducts, actions and performances of INEC actors in the exercise of their duties concerning election management and electoral governance in Nigeria. Nevertheless, this openness does not preclude what [43]. describes as the “inherent nasty, brutish and selfish nature of the human being in perverting even the most transparent human endeavour.” Thus, that there are post-election violence and contestations despite the application of the federal principle of openness in the Nigerian body politics is a not to say that, in federalism, there are no election malpractices, irregular electoral governances and election mismanagement. However, what should be worrisome is the inherent tendency of man, not to refuse being privy to electoral malpractices. Further, the occurrences of these unfortunate bad human characteristics must not be ascribed to the political system per se, but to the innate bad characters of the actors of the political systems, who are men with inherent shortcomings and not Angels, who are righteous.

The Theoretical and Empirical Delineations of Unitary Decentralism as a Political System

The unitary central political system is that, which state power is overbearingly amassed at the central government with discretional attributes delegated from the central government – the presidency of the republic; to regional or local councils; and in which the grant of power may be rescinded at the will of the central government [44]. A unitary state is a state which is governed as a single entity under a single powerful person, in which such a person incarnates the entire state at the local, national and international dimensions. Such a person is the ultimate public policy maker with central government and supreme powers to do and undo state power paraphernalia. As [45] observes, “In this type of political system, public and foreign policies are the exclusive reserves of the President of the Republic, who gives all shades of orientations in all policy issues at all levels of governance. Herein, the central government may create (or abolish) administrative units without consulting any other organ of the state, or any other authority, even the Parliament. Invariably, such units exercise only on the powers that the central government chooses to delegate to them in what [46]. calls, “residual political or state power”. Although political power may be devalued, or better still be delegated through deconcentration to regional or local governments by decrees of the central government, the central government may abrogate the acts of devolved governments or curtail (or expand) their powers. A large majority of the world's states (166 of the 193 United Nations member states, have a unitary system of government, although with varying degrees of state power sharing (Ghani 2006:76). Thus, the theoretical and empirical delineations of unitary decentralism is that, it is as a political system of political and administrative organization, which most or all of the governing power rests in a centralised government, incarnated by the President of the Republic, such that, it is the case in Cameroon in contrast to a federal political system as it is the case in Nigeria[47, 48]. Whereas in a unitary centralised political system, such as that operating in Cameroon (because, there are varieties of unitary centralised but operating with highly democratic virtues – such as in Britain, France, Japan and so on), the constitution does not make mention of the powers of the so-called decentralised entities. So much so that, the central government operates as a supreme authority to which the consent of nobody is required to make any desired modifications or appointment to any office, including that of election management organs. In this type of political system, the sub-national units have the right of existence and powers only as far as the President of the Republic perceives, since he the President unilaterally change any aspect of the country’s political life [49]. Unlike in the federal political system, the powers to appoint members of all state bodies such as ELECAM are vested unto the President of the Republic, who has no obligation to consult any other institution whatsoever. As [50, 51] alludes, he who beats the drums dictates the tunes of a dance.” Given that, in a unitary centralised political system such as that practiced in Cameroon, the president of the republic possess the all powers to appoint members of all state bodies, it is plausible to assume that, the members of ELECAM will work at his beacon and call [52]. In other a unitary centralised political system of this type, the true spirit of decentralisation on a territorially bounded democratic grassroots. is not actually a constitutional provision but a discretion of the President of the Republic. Consequently, herein the powers of locally elected officials are not prescribed in detail in the constitution but are used and tele-guided by what is called “supervisory authorities” otherwise known as the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which use its agents appointed by the President of Republic to lord it over the so-called decentralised entities – the regional and local councils. For instance, Law No 96/06 of 18^th January 1996, relative to the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, its article 1(2) stipulates talks about decentralisation simply thus: “The Republic of Cameroon is a unitary decentralised state.” Yet, a second type of unitary system makes less provision for territorial decentralisation of authority and employs rather strict procedures for the central supervision of locally elected governments. The classic example of this type is pre-1982 France. Until March 1982, when a law on decentralisation went into effect, the French administrative system was built around departments, each headed by a Senior Divisional Officer or prefets and subdivisions of the divisions or departements, termed sub-divisions or arrondissements, each headed by a Divisional Officer or sous-prefet. The Senior Divisional Officer or prefets and Divisional Officer or sous-préfets were appointed by the government in Paris to serve as agents of the central government and also as the executives of the divisional governments, the General Councils or conseils generaux, which were composed of elected officials. The system thus combined central supervision of local affairs through appointed officials with territorial representation through locally elected governments. Again, a third type of unitary system provides for only token decentralisation. In such cases, the officials responsible for managing the affairs of the territorial subdivisions are appointees of the central government, and the roles of locally elected officers are either minimal or nonexistent. Examples of this kind of arrangement include Germany under Adolf Hitler and also several formerly communist countries (Yetsin 2017, Wonghi 2018).

On gaining political independence from Britain in 1960, the emergent Nigeria state, adopted federalism as its political system, which to Nigerians, was and remains the most convenient method of state organisation, which holds as its, major leverages, the dominant objective of establishing an open society, which envisages and believes in the provision of the necessary political, social and economic mechanisms, for allowing its peoples greater freedoms of choices in diversity [53- 55]. Thus, the founding fathers of the Nigeria federation, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Michael Okpara, Obafemi Awolowo, Akintola, Ahmadou Bello, Tafawa Balewa, were in congruence in arriving at the foresight that, with the federal political system, the diverse character of the geographical political entity called Nigeria, would emerge as a strong united country in the international stage; if all its people are enabled to freely be involved in characterizing their independence in terms of open and widespread choices in political, economic and social lives. With this spirit in them, their mindsets initiated the drafting a non-other than a federal constitution, even if it was vague at the beginning. This initial document, drafted and promulgated into law, as the 1960 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria” became the bedrock upon all other subsequent constitutions emanated[56, 57]. So the major advantage adduced by the founding fathers of the Nigerian federation was the introduction and maintenance of the federal political system in Nigeria, which was aimed creating deep senses amongst Nigerians that laws and the rules of society are understood and applied more or less consistently and that there must exist solid mechanisms for the peaceful transition of power. Thus, besides this advantage epitomized in Nigeria’s federalism, federalism as a political system imbued with democracy like such as it is found in Brazil, United States, Mexico, Canada, and so on, allows a large and robust economy to flourish, with the accommodation of diverse cultural dimensions in one country. Therefore, at the end of the latest Nigeria’s military junta in 1999, the present document, under which the various national, state and local government areas institutions obtain their political and economic power to function; including the mandates of various political office holders, which were produced by the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria, is styled within the sole background of the federal political system. Invariably, therefore, the INEC obtains its authority, influence and functionality from the federal political system, which has produced the current Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, promulgation Decree 1999 and Decree No. 24 This decree is the supplement of official gazette extraordinary No. 27, Vol. 86, 5^th May, 1999, p. A855, which institutes the 29^th May 1999 as the date of coming into force of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution. In the commencement of this constitution, the initial powers and actions of the   Independent   National   Electoral Commission (INEC) are stipulated as follows: “Whereas the Federal Military Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in compliance with the Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme). Decree [58]. has, through the Independent National Electoral Commission, conducted elections to the office of the President and Vice-President, Governors and Deputy-Governors, Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen, the National Assembly, the House of Assembly and the local council” From the aforesaid stipulation, it is clear that, the tenets of the constitution are based on federalism as a political system, and in pursuance of the spirit of federalism as the political system in Nigeria, the INEC operates within the armpits and the dictates of the federal principle.

Essentially, most countries, which adopt the unitary centralised political systems, claim to operate on the principle of democratic centralism [59, 60]. Consequently, since it is usual that, all national institutions operating within a given political system necessarily reflect the characteristics of such a political system, it is not out point insinuating that, institutions such as Cameroon’s ELECAM created to govern electoral operations are tied unto the political system, which a country operates [62]. Prodding multi-party system and functional democracy requires that elections are properly managed. It has been argued that free elections are a prerequisite for the holistic development of any state. To [63] “the central aim of democracy is the choosing of leaders through free and fair competitive elections opened to the governed the electorate.” As we know, even if faintly, the end of the Cold War in 1989 contributed to the spread of liberal democracy especially across most parts of the developing world, particularly in the continent of Africa. By this, the end of the Cold War brought about a multiplicity of competitive elections in Africa in the 1990^s. This could be described as founding elections because they marked for various countries a transition from a period of authoritarian and single party rule to multi-party governments. The general outcome of these elections depends to a very large extent on how these elections are managed by the body vested with the powers to manage the elections. Consequently, free, fair and transparent election management is pivotal to the flourishing of democracy. As such, an impartial and independent election management body is needed to conduct a credible election. It is however vital to indicate that during after Cold War period, effective election management has eluded most countries of the world resulting in not only the rejection of the outcome of these elections but in most cases they have led to violent protests and sometimes protracted conflicts. In most African countries, elections management is the core functions of bodies which are either constitutionally created or are creations of the executive. These elections management bodies (EMBs) tend to be weak or unprofessional in their conduct of elections because they lack experience, capacity in terms of resources, both human and financial, and unfavourable electoral disagreement among others. EMBs are increasingly developing across the globe as Commissions that are both permanent and independent of the executive control. The general acceptance of elections as a key element in democracy has made the management of the electoral process very sensitive. From 1990, across most of Africa, Cameroon inclusive, elections have produced mixed outcomes, in most cases, electoral processes are confronted with problems such as impersonation, vote rigging and fraud, under age voting, multiple voting, unlevelled playing field and general acts of manipulation of election results, mudslinging and intimidation of voters and contesting candidates before, during and after the poll. In Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the accuracy of election results have seriously been contested leading to civil strife and wars in some cases. “Successful elections management with high voters’ turnout is an exercise which involves the operation, organisation and involvement of all the election stakeholders” [63]. In the process of credible electoral management, what is needed is an organ capable of conducting an election impartially and without confusion. As Lopez maintains, “effective election management requires organs which are inclusive, sustainable and independent, and which includes in particular, electoral management bodies that have the legitimacy to enforce rules and ensure fairness with the participation of other election stakeholders” [64-70]. The principal mission of election management bodies in any political system is to watch over the entire electoral process and to take appropriate steps against irregularities in the process to ensure that the election results reflect the choices of the voters. If there is no assurance that the entire electoral process is managed in a way that will ensure that the polls reflect the preferences of the electorate, those elected may not be seen as legitimate. As [71-78] supports, “a free, fair, independent and impartially managed electoral process is imperative to ensure confidence before, during and after the elections.” The role and performance of election management bodies as principal actors in the functioning of the electoral process is the key element in assessing the credibility of the entire process. Consequently, the need for the elections management process to be credible has necessitated the concerns of state partners both national and international over the centuries. Following the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Cameroon in 1990 and 1999 in Nigeria, majority of African countries have continued to use what they call independent election management bodies in the conduct of elections with diverse election management methods. The credibility of election management as cornerstones in the electoral process capable of organising free, transparent and fair elections depends to a large extent, on a number of indicators put together to reflect international norms for elections. This is what appears to be the most cantankerous issue in African countries, which have attracted enormous devastating destruction of human and material lives in Nigeria or Cameroon, as post-election upheavals. These norms, for instance, entails the establishment of an Independent Election Management Body, which is insulated from any political influences of the party in power and governments, security of office of members of the election management bodies, and ensuring transparency in the entire electoral process. In Cameroon for instance, section 4 (1) of the Electoral Code stipulates: “Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) shall be an independent body responsible for the organisation, management and supervision of all election and referendum operations.” However, the general contention in Cameroon is that, although elections organised by ELECAM have improved in terms of organisation, the organ still falls short of meeting the basic free and fair tenets, transparency and accountability standards of a truly independent electoral governing organ. This therefore calls for the much required changes in the composition of the electoral management organ, the method of appointing the organ’s staff and the latitude for it to conduct free and fair elections in Cameroon, at least to guarantee national and international confidence in the governing processes in Cameroon, [79- 84].

This paper sought to characterise political systems and regimes; and their elections governing organs in African countries, to discern, if these supra and sub-supra-structures are purveyors of post-electoral conflicts, contestations, extra-judicial killings, insecurity and instability in this region, than elsewhere in the world, with specific focus on Nigeria’s federalism and its INEC and Cameroon’s unitary centralism and its ELECAM. The paper argued that, whereas in most parts of the globe, political systems and regimes, and elections governing organs are incarnates of citizens’ well-being, human development in progress, prosperity and happiness, and above all solid substratum for democracies, in Africa, political systems and regimes, and their elections governing organs, are proven partners of subjugation, malignancy and propellers of underdevelopment, since they largely serve the egoistic and self-seeking ambitions of the political leaders. With these unpalatable attributes they have constantly remained controversial amongst the competing politico-economic and socio- cultural stakeholders in Africa’s political space, especially in Nigeria and Cameroon.[85- 91] The paper discovered that, although these structures epitomise sensitive and crucial duties for promoting peace, stability and development in societies, they rather asphyxiate insecurity, instability, democracy and countries’ disunity in the region. Cuing from the incessant post-elections’ contestations, the numerous incarcerations of opposition figures such in Cameroon - 2018, who attempted to publicly question the veracity of electoral wins claimed by the ruling party, the banning of disgruntled voters’ street protests, the threat to proscribe leading opposing political parties, and the general trepidations created in the aftermath any national elections in the region are illustrative.- [92- 94]. These events, which have been happening in Nigeria since the re-emergence of civilian rule from 1999 till date; and in Cameroon, since the re-introduction of multiparty politics from 1990 till date, are strong indicators that, political systems and regimes, and their election governing bodies in Africa are real con institutions against the will of the miserable masses. The paper further discerned that, the prevailing supra and sub-supra structures in this region may not in themselves be entirely culpable for the incessant post-electoral contestations and extra-judicial killings, rather it is the operational actors of these political systems and regimes, and their elections’ governing organs, in African countries’ who lack the spirit of fair play, tolerance, transparency and honesty in managing public affairs; due to their egoistic inclinations to promote the self-centred interests of their masters, who nominate them to govern these institutions in return for the accumulation of primitive wealth. Consequently, like elsewhere in the world, political systems and regimes in African countries can serve as incarnates of political and social progress; if they were governed by honest, prudent and democratic minded actors in the manner that, the actors with such virtues operate in civilised countries. Therefore, as a democracy and public policy advocate, I recommend that, inasmuch as federalism is a widely accepted form of political system, it should be overhauled or better still restructured by its actors in Nigeria to reflect the system’s real principles of openness, transparency and democracy; with the actors of the system imbuing strong political, economic, financial and social disciplined characters to guarantee free and fair elections governing organs. In Cameroon, the unitary centralism as a political system is currently unsuitable to accommodate the growing diversity of Cameroon society, which yearns for political changes. Thus, a change to true federalism appears to be the peoples’ will, not the ongoing panel-beaten decentralisation. Such changes, would allow structurally recruitment of actors of elections governing organs as well, because such actors will be chosen by the vast majority of the voters, rather than those imposed unto the voters by the leadership of the ruling political party. With the restructuring of Nigeria’s federalism, and the replacement of the unitary centralism with federalism in Cameroon, the incessant post-elections contestations, extra-judicial killings, and rampant conflicts will be reduced or eradicated in Africa.[95-100]. Away from these recommendations, the prevailing political systems and regimes; and their electoral governing bodies; including their actors in Nigeria and Cameroon’s political landscapes, may be strong cultivators, incubators and purveyors of yet unimagined human and material carnages, ever experienced in modern history of Africa.

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