In this article I focus on ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor), the flagship experiment on nuclear fusion, and more specifically on the communication issues and activities of this big science project, based on my experience as I led the ITER communication department from 2011 to 2015 and worked as ITER policy officer in the European Commission from 2016 to 2021.

ITER is managed by the ITER Organization, which has its headquarters in Saint-Paul-lez-Durance, a small village in southern France, 80 kilometres from Marseille, where the reactor is currently being assembled. ITER is funded by 7 members (China, the European Union, India, Japan, Korea, Russia and the United States). The aim is to produce, in 2035 at the earliest, 500 MW (megawatts) of thermal power from 50 MW of heating power injected in the plasma.

The seven ITER members actually represent 33 countries – more than half the global population – which have decided to work together and construct the reactor. ITER is among the world's largest scientific and peaceful cooperation projects. An interesting feature is the educational dimension of the project: ITER can be considered as a "generous" project as the countries involved in the experiment have decided to learn together, build the machine together and share the knowledge (the intellectual property) that will be generated through this huge international cooperation. The objective is not only to further advances in fusion science and technology but also to develop a worldwide fusion industry – and obviously to allow every ITER member to benefit from this pilot experiment [1].

As of today, it is not yet certain that fusion energy will one day contribute to mitigating climate change. There are high expectations – but also many uncertainties about the technology itself and its potential applications. On 28 February 2022, I was invited by the European Parliament to an exceptional hearing on ITER. The event was organised by the Committee on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament to discuss serious issues raised by the project evolution such as project delays, budget increases, radioprotection and, last but not least, staff management issues which resulted, tragically, in a suicide and a suicide attempt in 2021 on the ITER site in Cadarache, as well as a suicide in the European agency Fusion for Energy in Barcelona [2]. Every year, the European Parliament has to approve the budget of Fusion for Energy and grant the discharge (or not) of the management. However, for the first time since the project began, the European Parliament decided to have a special hearing where the top managers of both Fusion for Energy and the ITER Organization were invited to contribute and answer questions from the Members of the European Parliament. I was invited by the Committee in a whistle-blower capacity, following a report I sent on 2 November 2021 to the European Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen in order to report on the serious management issues I came across. In my speech, I talked about “management by fear,” “systemic drift” and “prehistoric communication” [1]. I also urged the European Commission to change the management of both the ITER Organization and Fusion for Energy. The whole meeting has been recorded and is available in 12 languages. The Director General of the ITER Organization decided not to attend the hearing at the last minute, explaining to the Chair that “he did not want a seat on the same panel as Mr Claessens”

So, what has happened in recent years that would explain why the European Union, which has supported the ITER project from the beginning and has so far provided funding of up to 18 billion euros (which represent 46% of the construction cost), is now having serious concerns about the evolution of this breath-taking endeavour? And what can be said about the role of science communication in this collapse? In any case, substantial changes in the management of ITER happened after the European Parliament’s hearing: the ITER Council is recruiting a new director-general (following the death of Bernard Bigot on 14 May 2022) and the director of Fusion for Energy, Johannes Schwemmer, was removed by the agency’s governing board on 13 June 2022 (Fusion for Energy 2022).

After a short description of communication issues within ITER, the article presents two major characteristics of the project:

• It supports a ‘political technology’, which explains at least in part why the project leads to public deceptions, in which science communicators have a share of responsibilities. As a result, in order to secure political support and funding, fusion scientists are overselling nuclear fusion and are lobbying for the scientific and industrial communities.
• There are serious management issues and irregularities (highlighted by the European Parliament’s public hearing), which can be explained, at least to some extent, by the fact that the ITER Organization does not enforce professional and scientific integrity.
• This situation calls for the lack of professional integrity to be addressed, not just scientific integrity but also within the staff regulations and codes of conduct of scientific organisations and public research projects.

In January 2011, I passed a recruitment competition organised by the ITER Organization and I immediately accepted the offer of appointment as head of communications and external relations. A scientist and journalist by background, I have spent most of my career in various fields of science and technology, mostly in international organisations. My new assignment started on April 1, 2011. I was delighted to bring my professional skills to the service of this flagship project and to nuclear fusion research, and possibly contribute in a tangible way to the fight against climate change as fusion is often presented as a zero-carbon source of energy.

I arrived at ITER with the conviction that the project would need a substantial communication effort. The scarce data available showed that the project was mostly invisible to the wider public. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2006, only 9% of European citizens claimed to be aware of the ITER project [3]. The first visitors I welcomed at ITER were telling me at the end of the scientific guided tour which blew most of them away: “Why are you not talking more about this breath-taking project?” they asked. I eventually published two books on ITER, one in French and one in English [4, 1]. Which was positively reviewed.

Most people would assume that a cutting-edge project like ITER should support a large variety of high-level quality communication activities and employ professional communicators. Indeed, most scientists and citizens I happened to meet at the ITER site or at international events expected this cutting-edge international project to devote significant resources to public communication in order to raise public awareness about the fusion’s fundamentals and potential applications. The ITER Agreement [5] the project’s legal basis, states (article 3.1c) that “The ITER Organization shall […] promote public understanding and acceptance of fusion energy.” However, the communication budget I had to manage in the ITER Organization was not commensurate with these goals as it was only EUR 100,000 on an annual basis. Therefore, the ITER Organization was only able to inform the public mainly through its website and a few publications including videos, all available online. According to unofficial information, the communication budget has been significantly increased in the past few years.

Thus, at least until 2015, ITER was a kind of exception in the research world, where the public communication of science and technology has become a key activity and an institutional priority. This was stressed by French awarded-mathematician and parliamentarian Cédric Villani at the recent Science&You conference which took place in Metz, France, from 16 to 19 November 2021 , when he underlined the remarkable development of science communication over recent years. He was right, as today a wealth of information and communication products are available, such as books, magazines, websites, blogs, videos, games, exhibitions, training etc., which address all possible scientific topics for diverse audiences.

However, this is not the end of the story as far as science and technology are concerned. It would be a mistake to infer that, thanks to this substantial increase in products, we have entered a “golden age” for science communication, which would in turn see public science literacy increasing across the world and lead people to address scientific and technological issues in a more informed and rational way. An abundant literature shows that science communication is a much more complex activity than what the Bodmer report [6] suggested a few decades ago, i.e. that scientists have a duty to go out and communicate the benefits of science to a wider public, and that a more ‘scientifically literate’ public would be more supportive of scientific research programs, and more enthusiastic about technological innovations – which would, of course, be a happy outcome for the scientific research community. Over the last decades, science communication moved consecutively from deficit to dialogue, then to public engagement and to participatory communication, following recent emphasises on public participation in science [7]. Research organisations also revised their communication policies. For example, the European Commission allowed in 2007 coordinators of EU funded projects to devote part of the research budget to public communication activities. According to many scientists, these activities contributed to improving the visibility and reliability of European research.

Despite these successes and indisputable progress, science communicators are still prudent about the best model or the best conditions to apply in a particular area. There is indeed much evidence about the limitations of the deficit model, which attributes public scepticism or hostility to science and technology to a lack of understanding – commonly attributed to a lack of information [8]. Studies and surveys have shown that on the contrary, the more people are educated, the more critical they may be vis-à-vis scientific developments and technological applications in some areas. For example, Drummond and Fischhoff [9] have shown that, on topics such as stem cell research and human evolution, knowledgeable individuals express beliefs consistent with their religious or political identities for issues that have become polarized along those lines. However, Weingart et al. [10] argue that public engagement with science has become a ‘buzzword’ reflecting a concern about the widening gap between science and society and efforts to bridge this gap. Based on their analysis of science communication journals, these authors note an increasingly vague and inclusive definition of ‘engagement’ as well as of the ‘public’ being addressed, and a diverse range of motives driving the rhetoric. In particular, they point to institutional pressures which stem from the fact that many research organisations not only have scientific priorities but also strategic and even political objectives, as the emergence of new expectations from political and economic stakeholders impose additional ‘missions’ upon universities and research organisations such as education for specialized job markets and accelerated technology transfer. Finally, and more generally, there has been, over the past few decades, rising public scepticism about the benefits of scientific and technological innovation and a diminishing conviction that social progress is evolving in parallel with scientific progress [11].

However, European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys confirm that science and technology are highly valued by Europeans [12]. During my professional assignment at the ITER headquarters, my bottom line was always that science must be the priority. Mediascience has to be based on scientifically proven facts and peer-reviewed research work. This is the price that we have to pay to build complex scientific projects. Hence, the goal of the communication team at ITER was to provide high-quality information about the project and about fusion in general. The best way to achieve this was to make sure the ITER’s communication team was working closely with scientists and engineers employed by the ITER Organisation and the domestic agencies of the ITER members. This is materialised in particular by ITER Organization’s Newsline, a weekly newsletter published in English, which provides a regular and popularised update about the project development, including the construction and manufacturing . This means also that science communication is a relatively minor part of the overall project communication.

As part of my professional assignment at ITER, I also advised scientific colleagues and managers to be open and honest whenever they speak to the public. My general recommendations regarding communication for ITER were as follows: be clear about the time horizon, as fusion will only be able to deliver a substantial contribution to the energy system post-2050; position fusion as an energy source complementary to, not a competitor to, renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power; highlight both benefits and uncertainties; and be as open as possible about the benefits and the real and perceived risks of the technology, including its economic viability.

Last but not least, the ITER Organization organise visits and ‘Open Door’ days which allow the public including families to meet some ITER staff and have a guided tour of the site. This seems to be a very effective way of engaging with the public about science, i.e. intentional and meaningful interactions that provide opportunities for mutual learning between scientists and the public.

Thus, in close to 5 years, the ITER communication team welcomed around 15,000 visitors on the site per year (until the Covid-19 pandemic), redesigned the ITER website (which is still online ), produced hundreds of photos and videos and published Newsline and “ITER Mag,” a magazine aimed at a non-scientific public and available in both English and French, together with one-off publications and reports.

On March 28, 2015, only 23 days after his appointment, the last Director-General of the ITER Organization, the French Bernard Bigot (who died on May 14, 2022), abruptly terminated my employment in the absence of any cause specified in my contract . “We don’t know each other but we are not going to work together,” he told me on March 28, 2015. “However, this has nothing to do with your competences,” he added.

I anticipated the possibility of this kind of decision. When an organisation recruits a new top manager, he or she may want to bring in his or her own staff and change the management style or priorities. I remember I told my colleagues, as early as January 2015, that the new director (who was still unknown at that time) may decide to replace me.

However, this type of abrupt decision is not always linked to a management reshuffling. It may be triggered by a conflict of style, for example if the new director and the head of communications disagree on the strategy to be implemented and the way the project should be presented to the public and the media. It may happen if public affairs and lobbying become more important than science communication. It can also be linked to personal issues or disagreements between some people. Last but not least, this decision may be motivated by political reasons, like the need to recruit people with a given nationality.

The key here is that ITER is most definitely a political project. It was launched by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the late President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, when they met for the first time on 19-20 November 1985. Ever since, the project has been managed by politicians, who sit on the ITER Council, the project’s top-level governing board, composed of representatives of the governments of each ITER member, and by scientists at the political level in the ITER Organization. The ITER project was born in a political context and supported for scientific reasons, but also for diplomatic and strategic ones: a specific technology, namely magnetic confinement fusion, has been used to promote international relations, help to overcome political tensions during the Cold War, and restore links between the eastern and western blocs. ITER can therefore be considered as a “political technology,” defined by Robert Bell (1998) as a technology developed and showcased for political reasons. Unsurprisingly, some decisions are of a political nature. In particular, the appointment of senior managers has to comply with a delicate balance of nationalities in order to be validated by the ITER Council.

Although the ITER Organization is leading the development of nuclear fusion’s science and technology, its role is not only, as far as communication is concerned, to disseminate scientific results and technological advances. The management is also actively engaged in promoting the organisation, activities, future perspectives and policy objectives (e.g. tokamak technology) and even political orientations (e.g. nuclear power as part of the mix for energy supply).

This intermingling of science, communication and politics is not new and the Covid-19 pandemic has once more shown that science and politics cannot be separated [13]. Today, many academic and scientific institutions operate in similarly complex situations, with many grey zones and moving boundaries. Several reviews of the activities of research organisations [10, 14] have shown that science communication often mixes with institutional pressures and public affairs activities to control the institution’s corporate image. There is growing competition among publicly funded scientific institutes and universities to attract staff, students, funding, and research partners. As a result, there has been increased emphasis on – and development of – science communication in research institutes over the past decades although a significant share of these activities does not primarily aim to disseminate scientific knowledge. For example, Carver [14] argues that science communication activities are most often a form of public relations (PR). Even public organisations care about their corporate image. According to Claessens the scientific community is still lacking a culture of genuine communication. This failure to properly communicate prevents the public at large from anticipating technological crises, and dealing with – and appropriating itself – future scientific developments as we have seen during the Covid-19 pandemic with the new mRNA vaccines [13]. Furthermore, following demands (or pressure) from governments and funding agencies, universities and research organisations have increasingly felt the need to justify their “legitimacy” and their connection with current society issues. Although it has been shown that science communication may benefit from PR research [15,16]. The ITER case provides yet another example of what may happen when science communication is dominated or even replaced by corporate or project PR.

This issue has also been highlighted by the so-called “Heidelberg scandal” [17]. Triggered by disclosure on 21 February 2019 of non-peer-reviewed results about a new breast cancer blood test and alleged scientific misconduct, the scandal caused reputational damage to the medical hub in Heidelberg before publication of the results of an external panel investigating the case. As a result, the dean of the medical faculty of the university and both the hospital's chairperson and its financial officer resigned from their positions in July 2019.

The ITER management is also paying attention to the legitimacy of both the management and the project. One of the reasons is that there is a substantial number of people across all continents who are strongly opposed to nuclear energy in all its aspects (both nuclear fission and fusion). However, it is interesting to note that the opposition to ITER has changed over time. In the early 2000s, opponents were mainly anti-nuclear activists. They considered that fusion, as a nuclear energy (which is correct), should basically be destined for the technological rubbish heap. This is the angle taken by most environmentalist parties and associations regarding ITER although, over recent years, the number of environmentalists advocating for nuclear energy and ITER seems to have increased. More recently, some trade unions and anticapitalistic groups have also opposed ITER, arguing that some ITER contractors do not respect French law, either by employing undeclared illegal immigrants or hiring seconded staff from companies which, according to them, do not pay any contribution to French social security and provide “low cost” workers to the project by paying them very low wages [18]. Meeting these opponents shows you the limits of what science communication can achieve. As witnessed in debates on climate change and Covid-19 vaccines, scientists are hardly able to express their voice let alone their arguments. During a public debate in a village close to ITER, some activists accused the ITER representatives of being “slave drivers.” The point here is that most of issues discussed in these public debates are not matters of science in any narrow sense, they relate to decisions of organisational, industrial or political nature.

Beyond the official discourse, the scientific community and even the lay public know there is still a long way to go before fusion energy becomes an operational energy source. The huge delays and budget increases of ITER have indeed supported the claim, widely echoed by the media and even the scientific community, that fusion energy will always remain a mythical chimera. Recalling that fusion energy has been in development for over forty years, the most sceptical state that it will forever be forty years away… A view that seems to be confirmed every day by the slipping delays of ITER. Indeed, the project was launched in 1985 and the first experiments were initially scheduled to begin in 2016. This date has now officially moved to 2025 (exactly forty years later), and will most probably shift further to 2031. The nuclear reactions should start in 2035-2040, so we will only know by 2040 at the earliest whether ITER is a success. There are various causes to the delays, but most relate to the late delivery of some components (one million in total). The construction cost of ITER is now estimated at around 41 billion euros which means that the budget overruns amount to nearly 36 billion euros – which is passed along to the ITER members’ citizens [1].

After my reassignment in Brussels in 2016, I experienced a number of “clashes” with the ITER management. Here are some examples of the issues I have raised over the last few years.

The first issue is the fact that the ITER Organization’s management claims that before the end of this century, fusion energy, which fuels the sun and the stars, could become a new source of energy on Earth – “safe, clean and using abundant fuel” – and that "ITER scientists predict that fusion plants could start to come on line as soon as 2040” [19]. This has also been affirmed by several fusion start-ups, mainly located in the US and the UK, claiming that they will feed up the grid with fusion electric power by 2030 or so. However, many plasma physicists challenge these claims, arguing that we are currently very far from producing this kind of power. “The assertions of sizable net power production in the near term made by start-up fusion enterprises that can barely produce fusion neutrons as well as by established laboratories that are afraid to use tritium have zero basis in reality. That these claims are widely believed is due solely to the effective propaganda of promoters and laboratory spokespersons” [20]. According to Reinders [21], who had a career in high-energy physics, “nuclear fusion [is] a fantasy pursued by single-minded individuals that [are] apparently unable to see reason and the fundamental failings of their efforts.”

A second example of these false claims, albeit crucial for the future of tokamaks, concerns the energy balance of ITER. For more than two decades, the promoters of the ITER project have created the impression that the reactor will need only 50 megawatts of power to operate the overall ITER reactor and produce ten times the power consumed by the reactor (i.e., an output power of 500 megawatts (MW) from only 50 MW of input heating power). In reality, the net power generated by the overall reactor will probably be close to zero, as reported by Steven B. Krivit [22]. According to Krivit, ITER will need an average electric power of 300 MW to run the plant. Incidentally, the ITER Organization sent an email to all the staff and contractors in 2021 instructing them NOT to communicate with Krivit.

A third issue concerns the huge delays and budget increases of ITER. There are various reasons for the delays, but most relate to the late delivery of some components that I mentioned previously. The construction cost of ITER is now estimated at around 41 billion euros (based on the EU contribution, currently estimated at 18 billion euros) which means that the budget overruns amount to nearly 36 billion euros [1]. Nevertheless, the ITER management still claims that ITER costs 22 billion euros (which is actually the cost of the First Plasma machine in 2008 euros). Two ITER Members (the US and India) have stopped paying their full cash contribution to the project.

Despite this, the ITER official discourse aims to minimise or even hide the problems. In their latest press release [23] and their official communications, the ITER Organization states that the main delays are related to the Covid-19 pandemic. The current ITER management is certainly interested in promoting public acceptance of the ITER project (which is directly tied to acceptance of its public funding) but its actions demonstrate that it is less interested in promoting accurate public understanding of the project.

Of course, I have been complicit and I contributed to these public deceptions, at least up to a point. I was responsible of the ITER web site until 2015. Many science communicators are employed by organisations and, as such, must fulfil their contractual obligations. A turning point occurred in 2015 when I was drafting my first book on ITER. There are indeed several serious issues such as the fuel supply, the economic feasibility and the absence of materials withstanding the plasma extreme conditions in terms of neutron and heat loads, which puts at risk the industrial development of fusion energy, as shown in the next sections.

I was no longer “his master’s voice”: in my books and in my lectures, I talk about ITER in an open, constructive – but somewhat critical – way.

In contrast, the current ITER management is very active in insisting on official language and fusion propaganda, hence confirming that ITER is driven by politics rather than science.

As a result, the ITER Organization has silenced or fired several employees who speak openly and honestly of problems with the reactor and who veer from the official discourse. For example, a senior manager and renowned nuclear expert, who wishes to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals, discovered that she had been fired only by reading the monthly list of departing colleagues and seeing her name there. But the termination occurred a few days after publication of a French news story in which she had been assigned to answer questions. The journalist unexpectedly learned that this nuclear expert had been misinformed about the planned ITER power values and this was revealed in the news report. The expert also spoke honestly about safety concerns regarding some of the materials. An ITER staff member who wants to stay anonymous told me that two of his colleagues have been fired because they refused to install components without testing them although they present a life-threatening risk for the maintenance workers.

The ITER Organization’s staff members are still instructed not to mention any of my books and articles. This was recently confirmed to a French journalist during her visit at the site (Celia Izoard, personal communication). Such an attitude is probably counterproductive, even on sensitive topics. For example, a recent analysis of the way US hospitals and health-care companies managed communication about personal protective equipment (PPE) shortages shows that restrictions on employees’ speech and gag orders imposed by the institutions represent an unhealthy concentration of power on the employer side which reduces individual effectiveness, negatively impacts corporate functioning, and damages institution’s reputation [24].

But this is only the tip of the iceberg, the most visible part of an organisation’s management. Communication tells you a lot of things and, as such, is a good indicator of the healthiness of a research project. The sequence of events reported here shows how management, personal attacks, public affairs and politics may interplay and undermine science communication. Obviously, this narrative goes well beyond science communication and is exemplifying how a public research project is communicating and is being managed. ITER’s Newsline and website provide very good information on nuclear fusion and tokamaks but the most contentious issues relate to the project management and the way they present the project’s raison d’être and life cycle.

Internal documents and personal information provide evidence on dozens of unlawful terminations, some of which have already been appealed and penalised by the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva, as well as illegally modified contracts (job description, grade etc), waves of staff resignations, mis- and disinformation (e.g. on power values), data manipulations (for example to reduce delays) and a workload unequally spread over the one-thousand staff (of which two died from a heart attack in the last six months). An American director and the head of personnel were both fired on the same day, much like we see in some Hollywood films, and were accompanied by security guards to their car without being given the time to properly hand-over their open files. The latter won her case in 2018 before the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO. In many encrypted messages, staff confide they feel unsecure and talk about “management by fear.” In addition, one suicide and one suicide attempt happened in the last months in Cadarache and one suicide in Barcelona.

There is also evidence that the ITER Organization has taken decisions which impinge on radioprotection and is hiding information from the French nuclear regulator, the “Autorité de sûreté nucléaire” (ASN), which is monitoring the construction of the nuclear buildings and the manufacturing of the reactor, to ensure that the ITER site complies with the French rules of nuclear safety and radioprotection. Recently, the ITER Organization decided to cancel the installation of all fire protection systems in the nuclear buildings (except in a few rooms) to push the schedule, without informing ASN.

All these irregularities and issues led me to become a whistle-blower and to submit, on 2 November 2021, a confidential 9-page report to the President of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the ITER Council. The document reports on management issues and decisions which may endanger in particular the protection of the environment, the obligations required by article 14 of the ITER Agreement, and even the future of the project. Scientific integrity is explicitly mentioned: “[all these] examples show how the ITER top management behaves outside the norms of science ethics.” It should be noted that the new EU directive on whistle-blowers has been recently implemented [25].

All the practices detailed in the report are unacceptable in a project funded by public money. The only explanation I found is that ITER is based on a political assumption—that fusion will soon become a commercial, safe and clean source of unlimited energy. In France (as well as in other countries), where nuclear energy is a highly sensitive and strategic issue, ITER is part of the national strategy and political leaders hope that fusion will reconcile their populations’ hesitancy about nuclear energy. Therefore, the end justifies the means and some people consider that opposing or even criticising a project like ITER is uncivil or unpatriotic. Indeed, dissent is nearly non-existent. For their roles in the project, the ITER Council members are reluctant to send negative messages to their respective governments. The ITER staff and contractors fear that they may lose their jobs (the ITER Organization’s employees are not eligible for French unemployment benefits). It would be much more transparent for society, and also helpful to scientists working for ITER if the political nature of the project would be highlighted and communicated. As Broks [26] argues, “the public engagement with science shares not only knowledge but the power that goes with it. This is not just acknowledging that power comes as a consequence of sharing knowledge. It is saying that power should be shared as part of the process of science; that power should be shared before the knowledge is created.” This is reality science communicators have to accept and may be confronted with. It may lead to the conclusion that, at least in some areas, projects or organisations, science communication is a myth. It is our responsibility, as science communicators, to disclose and denounce mismanagement and misconduct, especially in public funded research projects.

The fact that the end justifies the means may lead some people to carry out or cover data manipulations and scientific fraud. But before making such an accusation, I had first to consider the possibility that my vision of ITER is too much influenced by my own values, my education (Ph. D. in physical chemistry) and my professional career (ITER was my first experience in the nuclear sector). Martin [27] gives a brilliant demonstration that scientific fraud is neither clear-cut nor rare. The definition of scientific fraud, Martin argues, is discipline-dependent as “it is convenient to most of the powerful groups associated with it, including government, corporate sponsors and the scientific community itself, especially its scientific elites.” As a result, “a narrow definition of scientific fraud is convenient to the groups in society.” Therefore many types of bias and misrepresentation are often tolerated. The standards of scientific behaviour are not written in textbooks, they are all adapted to particular scientific, social and political contexts. “Within the overall power system in a given area, the standards of scientific behaviour are continually negotiated. The flip side of near-fraudulent behaviours built into the structure of science is suppression of dissent. The few scientists who speak out against dominant interests – such as against pesticides, nuclear power or automobile design – often come under severe attack. They may have their reputations smeared, be demoted, be transferred, have their publications blocked, be dismissed, or be blacklisted [27].” In parallel, most researchers and managers concerned with the subject will adhere to a “scientific omerta” and keep their head in the sand. This behaviour is rampant in the ITER project. How the scientific community (and hence science) maintains its integrity is a major issue for big budget projects like ITER which develop within complex political and institutional contexts. Furthermore, in these projects, integrity is an issue not only for scientists but also for engineers, lawyers, managers etc.

These difficulties and issues are all but marginal because most science mediators are employees and may experience pressures from their management and/or the scientific community. Furthermore, science and technology are highly competitive fields and close to business and politics. Politics increasingly dominates debates over climate change, the use of vaccines and nuclear power. We can even say that science is “politicised.” In crises such as the Covid-19 pandemics, we have seen scientific committees refraining from pointing out the mistakes made by governments [13]. Politicians are exploiting science, but scientists are also exploiting politics to promote their own research and ideology, and engage in a kind of “consumer marketing”. Actually, as Sabbagh [28] reminds us, “science has always been inseparable from politics”. The problem is that today, on some scientific topics and associated technologies, the line between science and politics is blurring as we see some concepts, although supported by a bulk of scientific evidence, challenged by well-established parties and associations and becoming increasingly politicised because the debates have moved from science to ideology and emotions. According to the Norwegian writer Jo Nesbø [29], “facts no longer carry the weight they once did [because we live] in an era in which the truth has been devalued by fake news, in which leaders are elected on a wave of emotion rather than their merits or political viewpoints.” This seems to concern also the ITER management, including some scientists, as several renowned experts notoriously failed to influence key decisions . Hence, promoting science is not necessarily the prime objective of Big Science projects, a situation which may encourage managers to act in a way that lacks the integrity we expect in the scientific world. Therefore, vigilance is key. Better oversight by the public and the press is needed. But this is not enough. We should ensure institutional integrity across the project as a whole and management accountability to avoid science getting caught up in political and managerial issues and having its own integrity undermined. While the organisation’s code of conduct explicitly addresses professional integrity, it can be concluded that it is not properly enforced .

This is also illustrated by the fact that the ITER Organization is engaged in overselling fusion and implements a sort of marketing campaign. Exaggeration of the quality, progress and social importance of scientific works is another common (and often intentional) misrepresentation of research, which could therefore be considered dubious.

For example, scientists would be concerned about saying that fusion offers an “unlimited” energy source as you can read in some reports [30]. Quite surprisingly, this is what you can read on the ITER Organization’s homepage4, even if the word “virtually” is added in the subtitle: “Fusion […] is a potential source of safe, non-carbon emitting and virtually limitless energy.” This type of claim does not work in favour of the project or fusion. Instead, “Precision, rigour, quality of information and the absence of any propaganda should be the key principles here. It is only under such conditions that complex scientific projects can develop in a sustainable and credible way” [1]. However, most research organisations and public science projects suffer the same pathologies developed by ITER.

The ITER website states that “Fusion fuels are widely available and nearly inexhaustible .” However, two recent articles [22,31] show that fuel supply may hamper the large-scale industrial development of fusion. Two projects like ITER will indeed consume all the tritium inventory. Scientists hope that fusion power plants could generate their own tritium by breeding it from lithium-6. But lithium-6 cannot be mined directly from the earth. Natural lithium has to be processed to enrich its percentage of lithium-6. However, there are only two industrial-scale lithium processing plants in the world (in China and in Russia) and they operate for military purposes. ITER will test four technologies to breed tritium from lithium inside the reactor but this is yet to be developed and demonstrated.

Despite repeated requests since 2017 to communicate more accurately and transparently about the project, and even though the ITER management has demonstrated some compliance with those requests (mainly through Newsline, the newsletter which is a masterpiece of fusion science and technology popularisation), the organisation published a press release on July 28, 2020, with an unequivocally false and exaggerated claim. It claimed that "The plant at ITER will produce about 500 megawatts of thermal power. If operated continuously and connected to the electric grid, that would translate to about 200 MW of electric power, enough for about 200,000 homes." This claim was false because it omitted the 300 MW of electric power needed to operate ITER and produce the 500 MW . The organisation has since quietly removed the press release from its website (the original is still available on the Max Planck Institute’s website ).

It is only in a recent article [32] that the ITER Organization admitted for the first time that ”Obviously, all the systems of the ITER plant will consume more energy than what the plasma is going to produce.” However, at a hearing in the French Parliament (Senate) which by coincidence took place on the very same day, the ITER Organization’s Director-General surprisingly said that “If God allows me to be alive, in 2035, I will see effectively 10 times more energy produced that ITER will effectively have consumed”  . A few minutes later, the Director-General replied to a question by stating that “at the end of the day, the efficiency will be between three and five, 3 and 5.” However, the projected gain for the overall reactor will not be ten, not five, not three, but about one.

Interestingly, the journalist of Le Canard Enchaîné told me that my peculiar position, having one foot in the project and one foot outside, plus the fact that I assume freedom of speech, gives me the unique chance to contribute and establish the truth about the project. Complex scientific and technological organisations such as ITER remain genuine “black boxes” for the public and the media, which prevent them from accessing detailed real information.

The fact that the ITER Organization is actively marketing and overselling fusion derives from the political dimension of the technology and the project. In this respect, the ITER consortium is acting as a lobbying organisation for nuclear fusion. This is a real issue for the scientific community: how does science maintain its integrity within the political and institutional complexities of a big-money project like ITER – although scientific integrity is only a minor part of the problems. But because the majority of the ITER staff have a scientific or engineering background, the research community will be seen as being an accomplice to fusion propaganda and public deceptions.

On 15 September 2021, Pietro Barabaschi became the new Director General of the ITER Organization, following the appointment decision taken by the ITER Council. On the very same day, Barabaschi asked me to help him improving the pubic communication of ITER in making it more robust from a scientific point of view. A few days after his appointment, he put emphasis on scientific integrity in one of his first interviews: “We need to stop hiding problems from our stakeholders and ourselves. The more you ‘decorate’ the truth, the harder it will eventually hit you back [33].”

However, several technical issues have the hopes that the machine’s commissioning would happen as planned. Early 2022, ASN put the assembly of the ITER reactor on hold. This will delay the whole project by at least one year. In a letter dated 25 January 2022, the ASN’s chairman instructed the ITER Organization’s Director-General: “For the time being, I urge you not to take any action […] concerning the sectors of the vacuum chamber affected by dimensional non-conformities.” Furthermore, there are two more issues pointed out by ASN. The first one is radioprotection. Due to errors in the design and construction of the walls of nuclear buildings including the reactor, the effective biological protection will be roughly 30% less than that projected. As ASN wrote in its letter: "The elements transmitted do not make it possible to demonstrate control of the limitation of exposure to ionizing radiation, a major issue for a nuclear fusion installation and […] for the workers around the nuclear buildings.” The second issue is that ASN calls for “an in-depth design review [that] seems to have to be carried out before you request again the authorization to assemble tokamak’s components inside the cryostat.” These are very serious issues and some experts fear ASN will never allow ITER to operate.

In 2022, defects were identified on two major components, the thermal shields and the vacuum vessel sectors. The need to repair such huge components will for sure cause an additional delay of “up to several months” as announced by the ITER Organization. The good news is that the impact of the new Director General on ITER public communication is already visible: the ITER Organization is now communicating openly and honestly on these technical issues.

To resume and conclude, I would like to leave readers, particularly young people, with these three thoughts.

First, because science communicators are often employees of an organisation and, as such, have to comply with their staff regulations and communication policy, they have to adhere, at least implicitly, to the objectives of their organisation. In scientific organisations and public research projects, science communication is never far from public relations, marketing, lobbying and even politics. Some managers use science communication tools to pass on political messages and justify management decisions. Communicating scientific results may lead to requests for editorial adaptations and even to censorship. Beyond ITER, this article provides insights on the role and status of science communication in research organisations and public science projects as some of them may suffer from the pathologies described here. There is a need to enforce professional – not just scientific – integrity in employee contracts, staff regulations and codes of conduct.

Second, if you are confronted by unethical decisions, a head-in-the-sand strategy is never a good idea. You would do much better taking legal action against your organization rather than hoping for a fair solution to somehow develop. Science and technology are today highly competitive fields, and they are moving increasingly closer to politics. This situation encourages managers to act in ways that does not match their professional records or the integrity we expect from people in the scientific world. Therefore people with professional credit and financial independence should not keep quiet. Thomas Jefferson said that "dissent is the highest form of patriotism." It is my hope that wisdom in accordance with the higher values of the ITER members and the European Union will prevail. It is my hope that members of the public and representatives of the ITER parties will appreciate my efforts to redirect the activity of the ITER project in a manner which better dignifies the support and funding given to it by the public and the participating governments.

Third, I am not sure whether ITER will contribute to fighting climate change but I am still convinced that it is a worthwhile project. Despite obvious management issues, 35 countries working collaboratively and building an experimental fusion reactor sends a strong message of hope and optimism to the world. It is a unique experiment that, if successful, might change the course of civilisation. Can we accomplish this feat without compromising our humanity and dignity?

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