Venezuela’s international posture has long been shaped by its vast hydrocarbon wealth. As the country with the largest proven oil reserves in the world estimated at over 300 billion barrels Venezuela has historically relied on its oil and gas resources not only as a source of economic strength but also as a diplomatic instrument [1]. The strategic deployment of energy as a tool of foreign policy, commonly referred to as "energy diplomacy," has defined much of Venezuela's international engagement since the 20th century. The foundations of Venezuela’s oil-based diplomacy were laid with the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 and the creation of the state-owned company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), which allowed the state to centralize revenues and control production and export strategies [2]. This development transformed Venezuela into a rentier state, heavily dependent on oil exports for government revenues, and provided the material basis for an assertive and, at times, ideologically driven foreign policy. Under President Hugo Chavez (1999–2013), Venezuela's energy diplomacy took on a distinctly ideological character. Chavez promoted a vision of “Bolivarian socialism,” which sought to counter U.S. influence in Latin America by forging alliances with leftist governments and channeling oil revenues toward solidarity-based agreements. One of the most notable initiatives was Petrocaribe, launched in 2005, which provided subsidized oil to Caribbean and Central American nations in exchange for political loyalty and regional alignment [3]. Venezuela also deepened energy cooperation with countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, often using oil as a diplomatic currency to consolidate alliances and promote its ideological agenda on the global stage.

However, the effectiveness of this energy diplomacy has been subject to growing scrutiny, especially in the post-Chavez era. The global collapse of oil prices in 2014, combined with severe mismanagement, declining oil infrastructure, and the imposition of comprehensive U.S. sanctions, dramatically reduced Venezuela’s oil output and export capacity [4]. As a result, the Maduro government has faced increasing difficulty in leveraging oil as a foreign policy tool. Despite these constraints, Venezuela has sought to sustain its diplomatic relevance by pivoting toward non-Western powers such as China, Russia, and Iran, often offering oil concessions and strategic partnerships in exchange for political and economic support [5]. The relationship between natural resources and foreign policy is not unique to Venezuela. Scholars such as Stulberg [6] and [7], have emphasized how states with significant energy assets often employ them to enhance geopolitical influence, secure favorable trade relations, and project soft or hard power. In Venezuela’s case, however, the overreliance on oil diplomacy, in the absence of economic diversification and institutional resilience, has led to a pattern of cyclical vulnerability. When oil prices are high, Venezuela’s international activism increases; when prices fall, so does its diplomatic capacity.

This article seeks to analyze the evolving role of oil and gas diplomacy in shaping Venezuela’s foreign policy, focusing on three core dimensions: (1) the historical development of energy diplomacy in the context of domestic political economy; (2) the use of oil as a foreign policy tool during the Chavez and Maduro administrations; and (3) the constraints and opportunities facing Venezuela’s energy diplomacy in the post-2014 crisis era. The article argues that while energy diplomacy has enabled Venezuela to expand its geopolitical presence, it has also exposed the country to significant strategic and economic vulnerabilities, particularly in the face of global market volatility and geopolitical isolation. By adopting a multidisciplinary approach that draws from international relations theory, energy economics, and Latin American political studies, this paper aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of how resource-rich states like Venezuela navigate global power dynamics through energy diplomacy. The Venezuelan case illustrates both the potential and the pitfalls of relying on natural resources as the backbone of foreign policy in a highly interdependent and rapidly changing international environment.

This study employs a qualitative method with an analytical-descriptive approach to examine the role of oil and gas diplomacy in Venezuela’s foreign policy. Data has been collected through the analysis of official documents, international reports, economic statistics, and library-based sources. The main focus is on the evolution of Venezuela’s foreign policy during the presidencies of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. Additionally, using the theoretical framework of realism in international relations, the research seeks to explore the connection between energy resources and Venezuela’s geopolitical objectives.

The foreign policy behavior of resource-rich states such as Venezuela is best understood through a combination of theories that address both systemic international dynamics and domestic political economy. In this section, we explore three interrelated theoretical approaches: (1) classical and neoclassical realism in international relations, (2) rentier state theory, and (3) theories of energy diplomacy. These frameworks offer a comprehensive lens for analyzing how Venezuela has used its vast oil and gas resources to shape foreign policy strategies, forge alliances, and assert geopolitical influence—while also grappling with inherent structural vulnerabilities.

Realism and Neoclassical Realism: Power, Interests, and the Role of Resources

Realism, as one of the foundational theories in international relations, posits that states operate in an anarchic international system where the pursuit of power and survival is paramount [8]. In this view, states maximize their relative capabilities including military, economic, and strategic assets to ensure national security and deter external threats. Natural resources, particularly oil and gas, are seen as strategic assets that can be leveraged to enhance a state's power and bargaining position in the global system. Neoclassical realism builds upon this foundation by incorporating domestic variables such as leadership perceptions, institutional capacity, and internal political pressures into the analysis of foreign policy behavior [9,10]. According to this approach, while systemic factors (e.g., distribution of power) set the parameters of state behavior, the way states interpret and respond to these constraints is mediated by internal dynamics. In the case of Venezuela, oil has functioned as both a source of external leverage and internal political legitimacy. Under Hugo Chavez, the government sought to challenge the unipolar dominance of the United States by using oil diplomacy as a tool to foster multipolarity and regional solidarity [11]. The systemic opportunity created by declining U.S. influence in Latin America, coupled with high oil prices in the early 2000s, enabled Venezuela to assert a more independent and activist foreign policy. Neoclassical realism helps explain why Venezuela, despite its material limitations, pursued an ideologically ambitious foreign policy driven not only by systemic incentives but also by Chavez’s personal leadership style and domestic political calculus.

Rentier State Theory: Oil, State Capacity and Foreign Policy

Rentier state theory (RST) offers another important framework for understanding Venezuela’s external behavior. According to RST, countries that derive a substantial portion of national revenue from external rents especially through natural resources like oil develop distinct political and institutional characteristics [12]. These states tend to exhibit weak taxation systems, centralized decision-making, clientelist networks, and a limited need for domestic economic diversification. One key implication of RST is that foreign policy in rentier states is often influenced by the imperative to secure external rents and maintain elite cohesion. Oil-rich governments may use foreign aid, energy agreements, and concessional financing as diplomatic tools to gain political support and legitimacy, both at home and abroad [13,14]. This logic is clearly visible in Venezuela’s Petrocaribe initiative, which provided discounted oil to Caribbean and Central American countries in exchange for diplomatic support and regional influence [3]. Moreover, the rentier structure of the Venezuelan state has reinforced a foreign policy that is highly sensitive to fluctuations in oil prices. During oil booms, the government expanded its international activism; during busts, it faced economic crises and foreign policy retrenchment. This cyclical pattern reflects the dependence of Venezuela’s foreign policy apparatus on oil revenue rather than a diversified economic base or institutionalized foreign service. RST thus provides a structural explanation for both the ambitions and limitations of Venezuela’s oil diplomacy.

Energy Diplomacy: Strategic Resource Management and International Alignment

Energy diplomacy is defined as the strategic use of energy resources such as oil, gas, and electricity to achieve foreign policy objectives, forge alliances, and enhance global influence [15]. In contrast to conventional diplomacy, which relies on political dialogue and negotiation, energy diplomacy leverages material assets as bargaining chips in interstate relations. Producer states like Venezuela use energy exports to create interdependencies, influence decision-making in recipient states, and promote ideological or geopolitical agendas. The concept of "energy statecraft" as outlined by [6] is particularly relevant here. It emphasizes the deliberate manipulation of energy supply, pricing, and investment to advance strategic interests. Venezuela under Chavez and Maduro adopted such strategies by offering preferential oil agreements to ideological allies, delaying shipments to political adversaries, and seeking alternative markets to bypass sanctions [2]. Furthermore, Venezuela’s energy diplomacy has been shaped by the shifting architecture of global energy governance. As the U.S. became increasingly energy independent through shale production and as China and India emerged as major energy consumers, Venezuela sought to reorient its foreign policy toward non-Western blocs and South-South cooperation [4]. This realignment is consistent with the logic of energy diplomacy: forming strategic alliances based on mutual energy interests, especially when traditional Western markets and institutions are closed due to sanctions or political tensions.

Synthesis: Interplay of Structure, Agency and Resources

The integration of realism, rentier state theory, and energy diplomacy provides a robust framework for analyzing Venezuela’s foreign policy behavior. From a realist perspective, Venezuela’s pursuit of regional influence and global alliances is driven by power considerations in an anarchic system. Rentier state theory explains how domestic dependence on oil rents constrains and shapes foreign policy options. Energy diplomacy, meanwhile, highlights the mechanisms through which oil is operationalized in bilateral and multilateral interactions. These theoretical lenses also help elucidate the vulnerabilities inherent in Venezuela’s strategy. As oil prices declined and the country’s production collapsed due to mismanagement and underinvestment, Venezuela’s capacity to project influence weakened significantly. The failure to invest in institutional reform, economic diversification, and technological upgrading left the country exposed to global shocks and geopolitical isolation. Ultimately, Venezuela’s case exemplifies the dual-edged nature of resource-based diplomacy. While oil and gas can enhance geopolitical leverage and finance ambitious foreign policy goals, overdependence on energy exports, in the absence of sound governance, can lead to strategic fragility and diminished diplomatic agency.

The findings of this study illustrate the centrality of oil and gas diplomacy in Venezuela’s foreign policy, while also highlighting its evolution across different political and economic periods. The analysis is structured into four major subsections: (1) Historical Trajectory of Venezuela's Oil Diplomacy; (2) The Chavez Era: Bolivarianism and Energy-Based Alliances; (3) The Maduro Administration: Crisis Management and Geopolitical Reorientation; and (4) The Strategic Limitations and Future Outlook of Venezuelan Oil Diplomacy.

Historical Trajectory of Venezuela's Oil Diplomacy

Venezuela’s modern oil diplomacy began after the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976, when Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) was established as a state-owned enterprise. The state’s monopoly on oil allowed it to channel revenues directly into foreign policy ventures and development projects [2]. During the late 20th century, Venezuela adopted a relatively pragmatic approach, aligning itself with Western oil markets while maintaining participation in OPEC. By the 1990s, however, economic liberalization under President Carlos Andres Perez marked a brief shift towards privatization and greater international oil investment. This era set the stage for Hugo Chavez's rise, which would fundamentally transform the relationship between oil and foreign policy.

The Chavez Era: Bolivarianism and Energy-Based Alliances

Hugo Chavez’s presidency (1999–2013) marked a significant shift in Venezuela’s foreign policy orientation. He rejected neoliberal economic policies and re-nationalized key aspects of the oil sector, emphasizing state control and redistribution of wealth [3]. Chavez articulated a vision of "21^stcentury socialism," drawing on the legacy of Simón Bolívar to foster regional integration and counterbalance U.S. influence in Latin America. Petrocaribe, launched in 2005, epitomized Chavez's energy diplomacy. Under this initiative, Venezuela exported oil on highly concessional terms to Caribbean and Central American countries. In exchange, it received political alignment and support in international forums [5]. Petrocaribe helped secure votes for Venezuela in regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and reinforced its ideological leadership. In addition to Petrocaribe, Chavez signed bilateral energy agreements with countries like Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina. These agreements included not only oil exports but also infrastructure projects, medical cooperation, and military exchanges. Oil thus became a currency of diplomacy, used to build ideological coalitions and exert regional influence [11]. Chavez also reoriented oil exports away from the United States and towards emerging powers such as China and India. Between 2005 and 2012, China provided Venezuela with over $50 billion in loans, repaid through future oil deliveries. This model allowed Venezuela to finance domestic programs while reducing dependence on U.S. markets [4].

The Maduro Administration: Crisis Management and Geopolitical Reorientation

The presidency of Nicolas Maduro (2013–present) has been shaped by economic collapse, international isolation, and the intensification of U.S. sanctions. Following the global oil price crash in 2014, Venezuela’s economy contracted sharply, with inflation soaring and oil production plummeting. PDVSA’s output dropped from 2.4 million barrels per day in 2015 to under 800,000 by 2020 [1]. In response, Maduro pursued new energy alliances with countries outside the Western sphere, including Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Russia's Rosneft became a key player in joint ventures with PDVSA, helping to circumvent U.S. sanctions through complex shipping arrangements. Iran also provided technical assistance and fuel shipments, often in defiance of U.S. sanctions [16]. These partnerships reflect a geopolitical reorientation of Venezuela’s oil diplomacy. Rather than using oil to build regional solidarity, Maduro has used it as a lifeline to preserve regime stability. The emphasis shifted from ideological outreach to survival and sanction evasion. Venezuela's foreign policy became reactive and defensive, focused on maintaining sovereignty and resisting Western pressure [17]. The Chinese relationship has also evolved. While China remains a major creditor and oil partner, it has grown more cautious, reducing direct loans and demanding stricter repayment terms. Nonetheless, Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil infrastructure and technology remains significant [18].

Strategic Limitations and Future Outlook

Despite its ambitions, Venezuela’s oil diplomacy faces profound structural limitations. First, the deterioration of oil infrastructure and chronic underinvestment have severely undermined production capacity. According to [4], Venezuela requires over $25 billion in investment just to stabilize production. Second, international sanctions have restricted access to global markets, financial systems, and technological imports. U.S. sanctions in 2017 and 2019 effectively banned PDVSA from U.S. transactions and prohibited foreign firms from doing business with Venezuela, isolating the country from major energy markets [16]. Third, the lack of institutional reform and continued politicization of PDVSA have eroded trust among potential investors. While Venezuela has opened limited spaces for private participation and foreign joint ventures, legal uncertainty and political risk remain high [2]. Nonetheless, Venezuela retains some strategic assets. Its oil reserves remain the largest in the world, and recent geopolitical shifts—including the global energy transition and disruptions in supply chains due to the war in Ukraine—have renewed interest in alternative suppliers. There are signs that some Western actors, including U.S. oil companies, are exploring cautious re-engagement under humanitarian and energy security considerations [1]. In conclusion, Venezuela's oil diplomacy has evolved from a tool of ideological expansion under Chavez to a mechanism of regime survival under Maduro. While the country still possesses significant energy potential, unlocking it will require major reforms, reintegration into the global economy, and the rebuilding of institutional capacity.

Venezuela's oil and gas diplomacy has played a pivotal role in shaping its foreign policy, serving as both a strategic tool for international engagement and a mechanism for domestic regime survival. The relationship between energy resources and foreign policy in Venezuela reflects a complex interplay of ideology, economic necessity, and shifting geopolitical alliances. Throughout various administrations, particularly under Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela leveraged its vast oil reserves to craft a distinct diplomatic identity, using oil not just as an export commodity but as an instrument of political alignment, regional integration, and economic bargaining.

Under Hugo Chavez, oil diplomacy was infused with ideological fervor. His foreign policy embraced a vision of anti-imperialism and South-South solidarity, inspired by Bolivarian ideals. Chavez used oil as a strategic incentive to strengthen alliances across Latin America and the Caribbean, establishing initiatives such as Petrocaribe to deliver oil on favorable terms to sympathetic governments. This not only secured diplomatic support in international forums but also extended Venezuela's influence beyond its borders. Through energy cooperation agreements, Chavez positioned Venezuela as a regional power capable of countering U.S. dominance in the hemisphere. Oil revenues funded a wide array of bilateral projects, from infrastructure and education to healthcare and defense, reinforcing the political and ideological loyalty of recipient states. At the same time, Chavez sought to diversify Venezuela’s global partnerships, particularly with emerging powers such as China and India. These relationships were structured through long-term oil-for-credit deals, which provided Venezuela with financial liquidity while reducing its dependency on U.S. markets. The strategic pivot toward Asia marked a significant realignment in Venezuela’s foreign policy, aligning its energy diplomacy with a multipolar vision of global order. China, in particular, emerged as a key partner, investing heavily in Venezuelan oil infrastructure and technology. However, the death of Chavez and the succession of Nicolas Maduro marked a turning point in the trajectory of Venezuela’s oil diplomacy. With the collapse of global oil prices in 2014, Venezuela’s economic model heavily reliant on oil exports faced a severe crisis. The decline in production, exacerbated by mismanagement, corruption, and lack of investment, significantly reduced the state’s capacity to use oil as a diplomatic tool. In this new context, oil diplomacy was no longer driven by ideological aspirations but by the imperative of regime survival. Faced with growing international isolation and stringent U.S. sanctions, Maduro turned to a narrower set of geopolitical partners Russia, Iran, China, and Turkey to sustain oil exports and secure political support.

These alliances were largely pragmatic, focused on bypassing sanctions, securing technical assistance, and maintaining a minimal flow of revenue. Russia’s energy companies, particularly Rosneft, played a crucial role in helping Venezuela navigate international restrictions through alternative marketing strategies and shipping networks. Iran also emerged as a vital partner, sending fuel shipments and expertise to keep Venezuela’s refineries operational. In this new phase, Venezuela’s oil diplomacy became increasingly reactive and constrained. The ideological solidarity that once defined its regional outreach gave way to ad hoc transactional relationships driven by short-term needs. The ability of Venezuela to project influence through oil was severely diminished, and its foreign policy became more insular, focused on preserving internal stability and resisting external pressure. The collapse of Petrocaribe and the decline in regional energy cooperation marked the end of an era in which Venezuela had once aspired to regional leadership through oil-backed diplomacy.

Despite these setbacks, Venezuela still holds strategic potential due to its massive oil reserves the largest in the world. Global energy uncertainties, including the fallout from the war in Ukraine and the evolving energy transition, have sparked renewed interest in alternative oil suppliers. Some Western actors have shown cautious openness to re-engagement with Venezuela, especially within frameworks that emphasize humanitarian needs and energy security. Nevertheless, any revival of oil diplomacy will depend on substantial reforms, including the depoliticization of the state oil company PDVSA, legal and institutional stabilization, and the lifting or easing of sanctions.

In essence, Venezuela’s oil diplomacy reflects the transformation of a resource-rich state navigating internal and external challenges across shifting historical phases. From an ambitious regional actor under Chavez to a besieged regime under Maduro, the country’s use of energy in foreign policy has adapted to changing circumstances, though at significant cost. The effectiveness of oil as a diplomatic tool has diminished in the face of economic collapse and international sanctions, yet its potential remains latent awaiting structural change, international reintegration, and renewed strategic vision.

Venezuela’s experience with oil and gas diplomacy reveals the profound influence of natural resources on a country’s foreign policy trajectory, particularly in contexts where oil wealth is closely tied to political legitimacy and international engagement. Over the past few decades, oil has been more than just an economic asset for Venezuela; it has functioned as a central instrument of statecraft, ideological projection, and geopolitical bargaining. From the revolutionary ambitions of Hugo Chavez to the survivalist tactics of Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s foreign policy has oscillated between proactive outreach and defensive isolation, with oil at the heart of both strategies. The result has been a foreign policy defined by both periods of assertive engagement and phases of strategic withdrawal, reflecting the volatility and limitations of resource-based diplomacy in the absence of sustainable institutional foundations.

Chavez’s use of oil as a foreign policy tool was both visionary and flawed. His administration demonstrated that oil could be leveraged to construct regional coalitions, challenge global power asymmetries, and offer a new model of south-south cooperation. Initiatives like Petrocaribe and bilateral agreements with ideologically aligned governments created a network of political alliances that enhanced Venezuela’s international presence and legitimacy. However, these efforts were heavily dependent on high oil prices and the discretionary allocation of state resources. The lack of institutional oversight, transparency, and long-term planning meant that Venezuela’s oil diplomacy was ultimately unsustainable. The dependency on oil revenues to fund both domestic programs and foreign policy commitments created a fragile model that could not withstand external shocks, such as the dramatic fall in oil prices or the loss of Chavez’s charismatic leadership.

With the transition to Maduro’s presidency, the limitations of this model became increasingly evident. Confronted with economic collapse, hyperinflation, and tightening international sanctions, Maduro’s government was forced to repurpose oil diplomacy from a tool of regional influence to a means of political survival. The shift in strategy was marked by a narrowing of international partnerships, with the focus turning toward states willing to defy Western sanctions and engage Venezuela through barter arrangements, military cooperation, or covert logistical support. The transactional nature of these relationships lacked the ideological coherence of Chavez’s alliances and further entrenched Venezuela’s international isolation. As the country's oil infrastructure deteriorated and production plummeted, the ability to use energy as a diplomatic asset also declined. Oil, once a symbol of Venezuelan power, became a symbol of its vulnerability. Despite these challenges, the study of Venezuela’s oil diplomacy offers valuable insights into the dynamics of resource-based foreign policy. It illustrates how natural resources can serve as both a blessing and a curse, empowering governments to shape their international environments while simultaneously exposing them to volatility and external manipulation. The Venezuelan case underscores the risks of overreliance on a single commodity and the dangers of politicizing national oil companies. The concentration of oil revenues in the hands of the state and their use for short-term political gain undermined economic diversification and institutional resilience, making both the economy and foreign policy highly susceptible to crises.

At the same time, the future of Venezuela’s oil diplomacy is not entirely bleak. The country still possesses vast untapped reserves and remains a potentially significant player in global energy markets. With the right combination of policy reform, institutional rebuilding, and international reengagement, Venezuela could restore some of its former influence. This would require a depoliticized and professionally managed PDVSA, legal guarantees for foreign investors, and a balanced foreign policy that emphasizes pragmatic cooperation over ideological alignment. Moreover, shifts in global energy geopolitics especially as countries seek to reduce reliance on traditional suppliers and respond to climate-related uncertainties may create openings for Venezuela to re-enter global markets, provided it can demonstrate reliability and regulatory stability.

In conclusion, the trajectory of Venezuela’s oil and gas diplomacy reflects broader themes in international relations, including the interplay between domestic governance and foreign policy, the impact of resource wealth on state behavior, and the constraints imposed by global economic and political structures. Venezuela’s story serves as both a cautionary tale and a case study in the potential of natural resources to shape a country’s international destiny. It highlights the need for institutional capacity, diversified economic planning, and strategic foresight in order to transform resource endowments into sustainable diplomatic capital. As the global energy landscape continues to evolve, Venezuela’s future role will depend not only on the volume of its reserves but also on its willingness to engage in meaningful reform and reestablish trust with the international community.

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