COVID19 Battel, Avoiding Millions of Potential Mortalities and Morbid, the Power of Public Health and Social Medicine, Lessons of Response and Containment and Future Questions
Published on: 2020-04-20
The recently available facts from the Covid19 pandemic response proved once again that the global health system showed remarkable fragility and obvious weakness in confronting the rapid out breaking and spreading of the epidemic and the continuous increase in the number of sicknesses and deaths resulting from it.
KeywordsCovid-19; Pandemic; Social medicine
The recently available facts from the Covid19 pandemic response proved once again that the global health system showed remarkable fragility and obvious weakness in confronting the rapid out breaking and spreading of the epidemic and the continuous increase in the number of sicknesses and deaths resulting from it. There are many lessons to be learned are the current pandemic as following.
- The existing health systems at national and global levels are preoccupied for long periods with the extensive investment in secondary and tertiary health services and the neglect of adequate investment in prevention and public health readiness', which has resulted in somewhat weak national and global infrastructures that quickly collapsed in their first challenge as evident in a current pandemic of Covid19.
- The unawareness of the global health system and its causes for what are secular and cyclical waves of reemerging and emerging communicable diseases, and absence to epidemiological and social transition analysis, importantly linked to the outbreak interns of forecasting and potential predictions,
- Accumulation susceptible(no immune) individuals at a population level, is extremely dangerous, either due to lack of past exposure(new virus) or lack of immunization coverage put general population at risk of infection, the only effective measures in such case scenario prevention of exposure which could not be powerfully addressed as reflected by the steady increase in cases and deaths.
- Weaknesses early in early alarm and adequate response, weak preparations due to a loss of faith in anticipating future events and, linking facts with hypotheses and theories that explain the occurrence of pandemics within the framework of scientific public health concepts.
- Lack of qualified material and trained workforce in public health and social medicine practice, adding to that, the lack of visions in applying effective response and containment strategy, significantly contributed to high morbidities and mortalities witnessed latter on.
- The continuous growth of fatal gaps in prevention and breaking transmission chain events measures to restrict growing out of the outbreak.
- Absence of preconceptions about the extent of the economic deteriorations that the virus outbreak can cause, whether direct or indirect on the global scale or on the local, national and regional scales. , whether it is directly related to the expenses of dealing with the consequences or economic losses because of the cessation of economic activities.
- International and national efforts to mobilize societies were not sufficiently coordinated and influential enough to create deep gaps in the nature of response as per each country, from which the virus infiltrated and invaded on a broader scale, means that controlling real health behavioral risks and the symbiotic social system were not addressed sufficiently.
- It seemed clear that the world has a great need to build the capacities of public health and social medicine systems and restructure them on new philosophies, including health leadership, the health prevention and control system, the early response system and the coordinated field response.
- The logistical effort showed a clear stumbling in the ability to absorb the outbreak momentum, whether that was reflected in health facilities infrastructures, devices, equipment resilient workforce. In addition, some examples of health systems that stayed historically to be the top performers appeared as if they were unable to keep pace with the events and were unable to cope with it.
- Many high standards health systems appeared to be confused and unable to prioritize and lack of vision to the adoption of response and comprehensive containment strategy. Strategy.
- The risk assessment, risk categorization, and risk mitigation strategies stayed ineffective and did not provide full protection for vulnerable high-risk groups that had given many victims and contribute to heavy losses.
- The coordinated international efforts were absent in terms of developing treatments, vaccines and rapid assessment kits. The ways to respond and catastrophe remained scattered depending on different responses that come from here and there. Even the World Health Organization was not able to be an international umbrella to pool efforts.
Gaps need to be understand and bridged
- The characteristics that make the virus spread rapidly among individuals and groups in the population.
- Mapping of the social, demographic and epidemiological characteristics of cases and deaths.
- The risk factors for transmission among individuals.
- How to build community and individual immunity.
- Potential gaps in prevention and public health measures.
- Closing gaps in Infection control procedures among health care providers.
- What integrated, comprehensive and coordinated public health response strategy we need.
- The shaping of International best practices, response comparisons of different health systems (China, Korea, Singapore experiences).
- Pathway of the epidemiological curve of the pandemic (when will we reach the peak ) and what comes after it
- Community mobilization and building up competent a health protection system
- Reducing losses and costs, moving from collapse to long-term work and effective coping strategies
- confrontation strategy with Coved 19 for the coming years
- On what grounds will we rebuild the global health system in light of the lessons and data that emerged from the Battle of Covid 19
- Preparation requirements for national and international health systems for underlying epidemics future wise
- Opportunities for employing artificial intelligence features, big data algorithms and science, and technology edges in upcoming battles.
- Building effective prediction systems
- The strategic shift from the surveillance to prediction and forecasting pro acting health systems.
- Investing in health systems research, public health research, and clinical research in addition to basic science research, to what extent we go.
- Understand the role of health as an existential driver of the global economy
- Lessons of resilience, perseverance, and sacrifice for the national health systems
- Reform the World Health Organization and invest in broader future roles for it in ensuring international health security
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